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1 Introduction
In the current crisis context, there has been a renewed academic and policy interest in studying the
effects of government activity.1 A key quantity that has attracted considereable attention is the govern-
ment spending multiplier (GSM), i.e. the increase in output consecutive to an increase in government
spending.
In this paper, we study issues related to the estimation of this multiplier in a Dynamic Stochastic Gen-
eral Equilibrium (DSGE) context. We stress a potential source of bias in the GSM arising from the
combination of (i) the transmission mechanism of government expenditures and (ii) the endogeneity
of government expenditures. We find that the transmission mechanisms and the endogeneity of policy
interact at the estimation stage through cross-equation restrictions, paving the way for potential biases.
To illustrate how these biases can arise, we focus on Edgeworth complementarity/substitutability be-
tween private consumption and government expenditures as an example of the transmission mecha-
nism,2 though alternative channels considered in the literature would yield similar results, as we discuss
later in the paper. Depending on its, this transmission mechanism may mitigate the crowding-out effect
of government spending shocks. The mechanics of the bias are then as follows.
Assume government spending policy is countercyclical, as suggested by several recent papers Cúrdia
and Reis (2010), Jones (2002), McGrattan (1994).3 Such an assumption would raise a severe challenge
for Neoclassical models. In those setups, following any shock such that both output and consumption
decline, countercyclical policy triggers an increase in public spending. This in turn increases output but
reduces consumption even more (crowding-out effect), finally making private consumption even more
negatively correlated with public expenditures than under an exogenous policy. This seems to be at odds
with postwar US data. Typically, over the sample used in this paper, we observe a correlation between
the growth rates of these aggregate quantities around 0.24. Allowing for Edgeworth complementarity
helps mitigate this problem. With such a mechanism, a rise in public expenditures would make people
want to consume more, thus counteracting the crowding-out effect. As a consequence, given a certain
unconditional correlation between private consumption and government expenditures that we seek to
1See, among others, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), Cogan et al. (2010), Fernández-Villaverde (2010), Uhlig
(2010). The common theme of these papers is to investigate under which circumstances the multiplier may or may not be
large.
2Such a specification has now become standard, following the semnial work by Aschauer (1985), Bailey (1971), Barro
(1981), Braun (1994), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Finn (1998), McGrattan (1994).
3In Cúrdia and Reis (2010) and McGrattan (1994), the forcing variables are assumed to follow vector autoregressive
processes, which can be interpreted as reduced-form policy rules when it comes to exogenous policy variables such as
government spending or taxes. Importantly, in spite of specification or sample differences, these papers all find significant
countercyclical policy rules that prove essential to the models fit.
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match, allowing for a very countercyclical policy will require a high degree of Edgeworth complemen-
tarity. Since, as we show, the GSM increases with the degree of Edgeworth complementarity, this will
mechanically translate into a large GSM. Conversely, omitting countercyclical policy will imply a small
degree of complementarity, thus yielding a downward-biased GSM.
To establish these results formally, we first work out a simple model with only limited dynamic features.
The model is simple enough that we can come up with an analytical characterization of the bias that
would arise from omitting the countercyclical component to government spending policy. We use this
framework to identify configurations in which this bias would be likely. We show that omitting the en-
dogenous component of the policy rule at the estimation stage would always yield a downward-biased
estimate of the GSM, provided shocks to government expenditures are not the only perturbations af-
fecting the economy. Because countercyclical policy and Edgeworth complementarity work in opposite
directions in terms of generating a certain pattern of correlation between consumption and government
expenditures, we can reinterpret this bias as a simultaneous equation bias. As a matter of fact, the sim-
ple model allows us to derive a formula for the bias that closely resembles those appearing in standard
econometrics textbooks in a demand-supply framework. By analogy with this celebrated framework,
an econometrician omitting the countercyclical spending rule risks recovering the policy rule parameter
when trying to estimate the private response to public spending. In all likelihood, this will happen when
shocks to government spending account for a small portion of fluctuations and/or the feedback effect
in the policy rule is strong. We show in an appendix that other transmission mechanisms considered
in the literature would yield the same results. Hence, our conslusion does not hinge on Edgeworth
complementarity/substitutability but holds more generally.
In a second step, using post-war US data, we estimate a quantitative model version via maximum like-
lihood techniques. We first find that government spending policy is indeed countercyclical. As a conse-
quence, the same sort of bias is present when the econometrician omits the countercyclical component
of government policy. This, in turn, translates into significant differences in the estimated long- and
short-run government spending multipliers. In our benchmark specification with Edgeworth comple-
mentarity and countercyclical policy, the implied long-run multiplier amounts to 1.31. Using the same
model and imposing an exogenous policy rule, we obtain a multiplier of 0.97, significantly smaller than
our benchmark value by 0.34 point. Such a difference is clearly not neutral if the model is used to assess
recovery plans of the same size as those recently enacted in the US. To illustrate this more concretely,
we feed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) fiscal stimulus package into our model.
We obtain that omitting the countercyclical policy rule at the estimation stage would lead an analyst to
understate the cumulated output effect of this package by 15% of the package itself or, equivalently,
around 1.4% of US GDP prior to the shock.4 Clearly, these are not negligible figures. Interestingly,
4In this paper, we insist on the long-run GSM. The main reason for this is that this number does not directly depend on the
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simulating our preferred model while imposing the counterfactual hypothesis that policy is exogenous
would not produce very different dynamics. This illustrates that, while countercyclical policy does
not seem to play a major role when simulating the model, it turns out to be an essential feature when
estimating the model.
To complement these results, we consider several robustness analyses. First, we investigate the robust-
ness of policy countercyclicality. To do so, we reestimate our DSGE model under a large battery of
alternative specifications for the endogenous component of government spending. The bottom line is
that our benchmark specification is supported by the data. Second, to address potential issues of policy
rules instability, we reestimate the model over two subsamples. Although the estimated parameters show
moderate signs of time-variability, our main conclusion still holds. Finally, we investigate whether our
results still obtain in a Smets-Wouters type model. Although this model yields different multipliers than
in our benchmark specification, we still find that omitting the endogenous component of government
expenditures would severely downward-bias the estimated multiplier.5
Our estimations yield a GSM which exceeds unity and a near zero multiplier for private consumption.
These findings are broadly in the range of values reported by Hall (2009) - typically in between 0.5
and 1.7 for output. This range of values derives from various methods. These include, for example,
GSM estimates from DSGE models (e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2011, Monacelli, Perotti
and Trigari, 2010, Zubairy, 2010), single regressions on government purchases (Barro and Redlick,
2009, Hall, 2009), and Structural VectorAutoregressions (SVARs) (e.g. Blanchard and Perotti, 2002,
Caldara and Kamps, 2008, Fisher and Peters, 2010). Interestingly, the DSGE literature itself generates
such a range of values for the GSM: the lower bound obtains in typical calibrated neoclassical setups;
the upper bound is obtained in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011). A key contribution of
the latter is to show under which circumstances the multiplier can be much larger than one, typically
when the economy has reached the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. Our paper adds
to this literature by spotting possible estimation biases that naturally emerge from such models. The
strength of these models lies precisely in their cross-equation restrictions which significantly contribute
to highlight identification problems for the GSM.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we expound the simple model and illustrate
the trade-off between Edgeworth complementarity and countercyclical policy in terms of matching the
persistence of government policy shocks. As shown by Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), short-run multipliers
can prove very sensitive to the persistence of these shocks, which would complicate the comparison between different model
versions. Focussing on the long-run GSM allows us to sidestep this problem. However, all our results hold in an assessment
of shorter-term multipliers.
5We also report several simulation exercises in appendix and obtain quantitative results that echo our analytical formula.
6Our analytical results also point out to potential sources of bias in SVARs, as emphasized by Caldara (2011).
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observed correlation between output and government expenditures. We then characterize the bias that
would result from omitting countercyclical policy. Section 3 develops a quantitative version of this
model that we take to post-war US data. We then explore the quantitative implications of policy rule
misspecification. In section 4, we investigate the robustness of our results. The last section briefly
concludes.
2 A Simple Illustrative Example
In this section, we work out an equilibrium model simple enough to obtain closed-form formulas il-
lustrating how short- and long-run government spending multipliers are biased when the econome-
trician omits the endogenous component of public policy. We focus on Edgeworth complementar-
ity/substitutability between private consumption and public spending as the transmision mechanism of
government expenditures. As claimed before, the literature has considered other mechanisms such as
non-separable utility, externalites on preferences and technology, or deep habits. Whatever the mecha-
nism considered, the log-linear equilibrium output takes the same form as that obtained below.7
2.1 The Model
Consider a discrete time economy populated with a large number of infinitely-lived, identical agents.
The representative household seeks to maximize
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
{
log(ct+i + αggt+i)− η
1 + ν
n1+νt+i
}
(1)
subject to the sequence of budget constraints (t ≥ 0)
ct ≤ wtnt − Tt, (2)
where Et{·} is the expectation operator, conditioned on information available as of time t, β ∈ (0, 1) is
the subjective discount factor, ct is private consumption, gt denotes public expenditures, nt is the labor
supply, wt is the real wage rate, and Tt denotes lump-sum taxes. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is
1/ν and η > 0 is a scale parameter.
The parameter αg, in turn, accounts for the complementarity/substitutability between private consump-
tion ct and public spending gt.8 If αg ≥ 0, government spending substitutes for private consumption,
7See Appendix A for a review of alternative transmission mechanisms of government spending.
8Here we use the specification adopted by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Finn (1998), McGrattan (1994), among
others. Alternatively, CES specifications of utility have been considered (see Bouakez and Rebei, 2007, McGrattan, Roger-
son and Wright, 1997). These yield the exact same log-linearized equilibrium conditions as our specification.
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with perfect substitution if αg = 1, as in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). In this case, a permanent
increase in government spending has no effect on output and hours but reduces private consumption,
through a perfect crowding-out effect. In the special case αg = 0, we recover the standard business cy-
cle model, with government spending operating through a negative income effect on labor supply (see
Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992, Baxter and King, 1993). When the parameter αg < 0, gov-
ernment spending complements private consumption. Then, it can be the case (depending on the labor
supply elasticity) that private consumption will react positively to an unexpected increase in government
spending.
The representative firm produces a homogeneous final good yt using labor as the sole input, according
to the constant returns-to-scale technology
yt = e
ztnt.
Here, zt is a shock to total factor productivity, assumed to be iid with zt ∼ N(0, σ2z). Profit maximiza-
tion implies that the marginal productivity of labor equals the real wage, i.e. wt = ezt .
Government purchases are entirely financed by taxes,
Tt = gt.
As in the recent literature emphasizing the relevance of stabilizing government spending rules (see,
among others, Cúrdia and Reis, 2010, Jones, 2002, Leeper, Plante and Traum, 2010, McGrattan, 1994)
we specify a feedback rule of the following form
gt = g¯
(
yt
yt−1
)−ϕg
eut (3)
where g¯ is a scale factor that pins down the deterministic steady-state level of government expendi-
tures and ϕg governs the responsiveness of gt to output growth. The random term ut represents the
discretionary part of policy and is assumed to be iid with ut ∼ N(0, σ2u). A simpler rule would have
government spending react to current output only. A problem with such a specification within our
simplified model is that it would compromise identification of the policy parameter. Anticipating on
the next section, we also notice that the dynamic rule (3) is favored by the data when we estimate a
quantitative model version.
Finally, the market clearing condition on the goods market writes
yt = ct + gt.
Combining the household’s first order condition on labor, the profit maximization condition, and the
resource constraint, one finally arrives at the equilibrium condition
ηyνt =
e(1+ν)zt
yt − (1− αg)gt . (4)
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Conditions (3) and (4) together constitute the equilibrium system governing the dynamics of the above
economy. To ensure positiveness of the marginal utility of consumption, we henceforth impose the
restriction αg > (sg − 1)/sg, where sg ≡ g¯/y¯ ∈ [0, 1) is the steady-state public spending-output ratio.
In this economy, the long-run GSM is defined as follows.
Definition 1. The long-run government spending multiplier, denoted by ∆y/∆g, is the increase in
steady-state output y¯ consecutive to an increase in steady-state government spending expenditures g¯,
i.e. formally
∆y
∆g
≡ dy¯
dg¯
.
From this definition and the structure of the above model economy, the following proposition states key
properties of the long-run GSM.
Proposition 1. Under the preceding assumptions:
1. The long-run government spending multiplier ∆y/∆g is
∆y
∆g
=
1− αg
1 + ν[1− sg(1− αg)] .
2. The multiplier is a decreasing function of αg.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This proposition establishes that the long-run GSM depends on the share of government spending in
output (sg), on the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor (ν), and on the parameter governing the degree of
Edgeworth complementarity between private consumption and government expenditures (αg). Impor-
tantly, ∆y/∆g does not depend directly on the degree of countercyclicality of the government spending
rule (ϕg). The main thesis of this paper, though, is that ϕg can contaminate the long-run GSM indirectly.
To gain intuition as to how this can happen, we start by loglinearizing the system (3)-(4) in the neigh-
borhood of the deterministic steady state. This yields
yˆt = αgˆt + ζzt (5)
gˆt = −ϕg(yˆt − yˆt−1) + ut (6)
where a letter with a hat denotes the logdeviation (with respect to steady-state value) of the associated
variable and the composite parameters α and ζ are defined as
α ≡ sg(1− αg)
1 + ν[1− sg(1− αg)] ,
ζ ≡ (1 + ν)(1− sg(1− αg))
1 + ν[1− sg(1− αg)] .
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Figure 1: Iso-Correlation loci in the (ϕg, αg) plane
Notes: The iso-correlation loci are computed assuming, for illustrative purposes, ν = 5, sg = 0.2, and Corr(yˆ, gˆ) = 0.3. In the σu < σz case,
we impose σu/σz = 0.5. In the σu > σz case, we impose σu/σz = 2.
In the remainder, to simplify the algebra, we drop the coefficient ζ from the dynamic system. This can
always be done by rescaling appropriately the standard error of zt.
For ν and sg set at given values, the value of α summarizes the complementarity/substitutability between
private and public consumption. This composite parameter and the long-run government spending
multiplier are tightly linked since
∆y
∆g
=
α
sg
The system (5)-(6) makes clear how the degree of countercyclicality of the government spending rule
and the degree of Edgeworth complementarity between private consumption and government spending
work in opposite directions in terms of generating a positive correlation between yˆ and gˆ. Intuitively,
Edgeworth complementarity between private consumption and government spending (i.e. αg < 0) tends
to increase the correlation between y and g, since under such a configuration an increase in government
expenditures would induce people to consume more; at the same time, a countercyclical policy rule
reduces this correlation.
This yields a trade-off: given an observed correlation between output and government spending, a
highly countercyclical policy must be compensated by a high degree of Edgeworth complementarity.
Conversely, if policy is exogenous, a lower degree of Edgeworth complementarity will suffice to match
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the observed pattern of correlation between output and government expenditures. This is illustrated in
figure 1.
This figure shows two iso-correlation loci in the (ϕg, αg) plane, depending on the relative sizes of the
structural disturbances. Each point in these loci gives a particular (ϕg, αg) combination resulting in the
same correlation between output and government spending. When σz > σu, the iso-correlation locus is
decreasing with ϕg, with a steep slope. This means that, as the degree of countercyclicality on policy
increases, it takes more and more complementarity to match the observed correlation. When σu > σz,
the iso-correlation curve is much flatter but the trade-off still exists.
This trade-off paves the way for a potential bias in the estimated degree of Edgeworth complementarity
(and, by virtue of proposition 1, in the estimated multiplier). Suppose that an econometrician seeks to
estimate α but uses a misspecified model in which ϕg is set to zero while actually ϕg > 0. The above
reasoning suggests that this would result in a downward-biased estimate of α, immediately translating
into a downward-biased estimated multiplier. The next section formally establishes this.
2.2 The Effect of Omitting Endogenous Policy
Direct calculations yield the model’s reduced-form
yˆt =
αϕg
1 + αϕg
yˆt−1 +
α
1 + αϕg
ut +
1
1 + αϕg
zt (7)
gˆt =
ϕg
1 + αϕg
yˆt−1 +
1
1 + αϕg
ut − ϕg
1 + αϕg
zt (8)
From this reduced form, the structural parameters (α, ϕg, σu, σz) can be recovered using the plim of
the maximum likelihood estimation or an instrumental variable technique (with a relevant choice of
instrumental variables). An easy way to obtain a consistent estimator of α relies on indirect estimation
using the following representation of the reduced form
yˆt = pi1yˆt−1 + 1,t (9)
gˆt = pi2yˆt−1 + 2,t (10)
The plim estimators of pi1 and pi2 are given by
pˆi1 =
E{yˆtyˆt−1}
E{yˆ2t }
and pˆi2 =
E{gˆtyˆt−1}
E{yˆ2t }
from which we deduce
αˆ =
pˆi1
pˆi2
=
E{yˆtyˆt−1}
E{gˆtyˆt−1}
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From (7)-(8), we obtain:
E{yˆtyˆt−1} = αϕg
1 + αϕg
E{yˆ2t } and E{gˆtyˆt−1} =
ϕg
1 + αϕg
E{yˆ2t }
The indirect estimator αˆ of α is thus consistent. Similarly, ϕˆg is also a consistent estimator of ϕg.
Now, imagine the econometrician ignores the feedback rule and seeks to estimate the parameter α from
data (yˆt, gˆt) generated by the model (7)-(8). The model considered by this econometrician is thus of the
form
yˆt = α˜u˜t + z˜t (11)
gˆt = u˜t. (12)
By ignoring the parameter ϕg, the econometrician is implicitly estimating the government spending
effects on output through a single-equation approach in a simultaneous-equation setup. As is well
known from standard econometrics textbooks, she potentially faces a severe simultaneous-equation
bias (see Greene, 1997, Hamilton, 1994).
To see this clearly, the ML estimator ˆ˜α of α˜ would be
ˆ˜α =
E{yˆtgˆt}
E{gˆ2t }
which simply corresponds to the OLS estimator. While ϕg exerts no influence on the long-run multiplier
(see proposition 1), the next proposition establishes that this parameter corrupts the estimated composite
parameter α˜ when policy is assumed to be exogenous.
Proposition 2. Under the previous hypotheses
1. The plim of the Maximum Likelihood estimator ˆ˜α of α˜ is
ˆ˜α =
α(1 + αϕg)σ
2
u − ϕgσ2z
(1 + αϕg)σ2u + 2ϕ
2
gσ
2
z
. (13)
2. Whenever σz > 0 and ϕg > 0, ˆ˜α is downward-biased.
3. ∀σz > 0 and ∀σu > 0, we have
(a) If α ≥ σz/σu, then
∂
∂ϕg
( ˆ˜α− α) < 0, ∀ϕg ≥ 0.
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(b) If α < σz/σu, ∃ ϕ¯g(α, σz, σu) > 0 such that
∂
∂ϕg
( ˆ˜α− α) ≤ 0, ∀ϕg ∈ [0, ϕ¯g(α, σu, σz)],
∂
∂ϕg
( ˆ˜α− α) > 0, ∀ϕg > ϕ¯g(α, σu, σz).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Part 1 of proposition 2 establishes that the estimated value of ˆ˜α is corrupted, in a non-linear way, by ϕg,
σu and σz. The OLS regression does not pin down the effects of gˆ on yˆ but an average of private behavior
and public policy, with weights that depend on the relative size of the shocks’ variances. Notice that
this is more or less the formula displayed in standard econometrics textbooks in a demand-supply setup
(e.g., see Hamilton, 1994, chap. 9).
Part 2 of proposition 2 indicates under which circumstances omitting the endogenous component of
government spending policy would result in a downward-biased estimate of α. Notice that under such
circumstances, the long-run GSM is systematically downward-biased, by virtue of Proposition 1. Con-
versely, the only circumstances in which the bias vanishes are either ϕg = 0 or σz = 0. When ϕg = 0,
the bias is obviously zero since, in this case, the model is well specified. If σz = 0, the bulk of fluc-
tuations in yˆ are accounted for by government spending shocks. In this case, the endogeneity bias
vanishes. Endogenous public spending is positively related to the shock u and the (inverse) government
policy shifts along the output equation.
When σz > 0 and σu > 0, the bias may increase or decrease with ϕg, depending on α, σz, and σu, as
stated in part 3 of Proposition 2. If α ≥ σz/σu, the bias increases. If α < σz/σu, the bias increases with
ϕg, up to a threshold value above which it decreases. However, the bias never reverts back to zero since
limϕg→∞ ˆ˜α = 0 < α.
In the special case σz > 0 and σu → 0, government spending shocks do not contribute much to the
variance of yˆ. In this case, we obtain ˆ˜α → −1/(2ϕg). Thus, omitting the endogeneity of government
spending would lead us to estimate a negative value of α˜. This is because endogenous public spending
is negatively related to the shock z which shifts aggregate output. The covariance between yˆt and gˆt is
negative and thus the estimated effect of public spending on output is negative. We are in the case when
the output equation moves along the policy rule equation (which is truly downward slopping). In this
case, the econometrician almost recovers the reverse government policy rule.
So far, we have focussed on bias for the long-run GSM. However, omitting the endogeneity of the
policy rule also has critical consequences on the estimated short-run responses of output to a government
spending shock. First, the estimated effect of government expenditures vanishes immediately one period
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after the shock. This is not the case in the model (7)-(8) where the effects of the government policy
shock are long lasting, provided ϕg > 0. This is rather trivial and we do not make much of it. More
importantly, the response of yˆt on impact is biased provided ϕg 6= 0. However, the sign of the bias is
less trivial than for the long–run GSM. Indeed, the parameter ϕg affects the response on impact of yˆt in
the model (7)-(8). This response is given by
α
1 + αϕg
,
and thus it is a decreasing function of ϕg for α > 0. At the same time, an econometrician omitting the
endogeneity of the government policy would obtain a response on impact equal to ˆ˜α, which may be a
decreasing function of ϕg, too (See Proposition 2 and the related discussion). It can be shown that if
ϕg > ϕ¯g and α <
√
3(σz/σu), with
ϕ¯g =
α2(σ2u/σ
2
z)− 1
α (3− α2(σ2u/σ2z))
,
then the estimated response under a misspecified policy rule will under-estimate the true response. The
sign of ϕ¯g depends on the value of α and on the relative variance of the two shocks σz/σu. When
α > (σz/σu), ϕ¯g is positive and the government policy must be sufficiently counter–cyclical to get a
downward bias. This configuration corresponds to the situation where the government policy shock is
the main driver of yˆ. Conversely, when α < (σz/σu), ϕ¯g is negative and the downward bias under the
misspecified policy rule will appear more likely, i.e. for a wider range of values for ϕg. This will happen
when the shock to government policy accounts for a small portion of the the variance of yˆ. Notice that
a counter-cyclical policy is a sufficient condition to under-estimate the true impact response of output.
To sum up, we have shown analytically in a tractable model that omitting the endogenous component
of government spending can result in a downward-biased estimate of the long- or short-run government
spending multiplier. In this simple setup, the downward bias is a mix of a simultaneous-equation bias
and an omitted-variable bias. It is the result of two conflicting economic forces, one that magnifies the
correlation between output and government spending (Edgeworth complementarity) and the other that
reduces it (countercyclical government spending rule).
In the following section, we consider a quantitative DSGE model which we estimate on US data via
maximum likelihood techniques. While the model is too complicated to get such a sharp bias character-
ization, it proves a useful tool to investigate whether omitting the endogenous component of government
spending actually results in a quantitatively significant bias in estimated government spending multipli-
ers.
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3 A Quantitative Model
We now work out a quantitative extension of the previous model that we formally take to the data. We
extend the previous setup by allowing for capital accumulation, habit formation in leisure decisions, and
multiple shocks. While the model is arguably very stylized, it turns out to deliver a good fit.9
3.1 The Model
The representative household’s intertemporal expected utility is
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
eat+i log(ct+i + αggt+i)− ebt+i η1 + ν
(
nt+i
nφt+i−1
)1+ν (14)
where Et{·} denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information set at period t and β ∈
(0, 1) is the subjective discount factor. As in the previous section, the parameter αg governs the substi-
tutability/complementarity between private consumption and public expenditures.
The parameter φ governs the habit persistence in labor supply and η ≥ 0 is a scale parameter. When
the parameter φ 6= 0, labor supply decisions are subject to time non-separabilities. If φ < 0, labor
supply displays inter-temporal substitutability, whereas φ > 0 implies inter-temporal complementarity.
Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) showed that a specification with intertemporal complemen-
tarities is favored by the data. More recently, this specification has proven to be empirically relevant,
as it translates habit persistence in leisure choices into aggregate output persistence (see Bouakez and
Kano, 2006, Dupaigne, Fève and Matheron, 2007, Wen, 1998). While other specifications that allow
to capture the persistence in hours have been considered in the literature (e.g. adjustment costs on
labor input, as in Chang, Doh and Schorfheide 2007, or learning-by-doing, as in Chang, Gomes and
Schorfheide 2002), it turns out that the implied reduced-form are almost identical to that resulting from
our specification.
Utility derived from consumption is altered by a preference shock at, which obeys
at = ρaat−1 + σaζa,t
where |ρa| < 1, σa > 0 and ζa,t is iid with ζa,t ∼ N(0, 1). Labor disutility is subject to a preference
shock bt, which obeys
bt = ρbbt−1 + σbζb,t
9In Appendices D and E, we modify the benchmark specification allowing for (i) habits in consumption and dynamic
adjustment costs and (ii) news shocks in the policy rule. Our results are robust to these perturbations.
13
where |ρb| < 1, σb > 0 and ζb,t is iid with ζb,t ∼ N(0, 1). As noted by Galí (2005), this shock accounts
for a sizeable portion of aggregate fluctuations. Moreover, it allows us to capture various distortions on
the labor market, labeled labor wedge in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007).
The representative household supplies hours nt and capital kt to firms, and pays a lump-sum tax Tt to
the government. Accordingly, the representative household’s budget constraint in every period t is
ct + xt ≤ wtnt + rtkt − Tt (15)
where wt is the real wage, rt is the rental rate of capital, and xt denotes investment. The capital stock
evolves according to
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + xt (16)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the constant depreciation rate. The representative household thus maximizes (14)
subject to the sequence of constraints (15) and (16), t ≥ 0.
The representative firm produces a homogeneous final good yt through the constant returns-to-scale
technology
yt = k
θ
t (e
ztnt)
1−θ
where kt and nt denote the inputs of capital and labor, respectively, θ ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of output
with respect to capital, and zt is a shock to total factor productivity, which follows a random walk
process with drift of the form
zt = log(γz) + zt−1 + σzζz,t
where σz > 0 and ζz,t is iid with ζz,t ∼ N(0, 1). The constant term γz > 1 is the drift term and accounts
for the deterministic component of the growth process. Profit maximization implies rt = θyt/kt and
wt = (1− θ)yt/nt.
Government expenditures are entirely financed by taxes Tt = gt. Notice that Ricardian equivalence
holds in our setup, so that introducing government debt is unnecessary. The stationary component of
government spending is given by
gte
−zt = g¯sg˜teg
?
t ,
where g¯s denotes the deterministic steady-state value of gte−zt . The endogenous policy component g˜t
obeys
log(g˜t) = −ϕg (∆ log(yt)− log(γz)) ,
and the stochastic (discretionary) component is assumed to follow an autoregressive process of the form:
g?t = ρgg
?
t−1 + σgζg,t
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where |ρg| < 1, σg > 0 and ζg,t is iid with ζg,t ∼ N(0, 1). Here, ∆ stands for the first-difference op-
erator. The parameter ϕg is the policy rule parameter linking the stationary component of government
policy to demeaned output growth. If ϕg < 0, the policy rule contains a procyclical component that
triggers an increase in government expenditures whenever output growth is above its average value. In
constrast, if ϕg > 0, the policy rule features a countercyclical component. In both cases however, assess-
ing the degree of pro- or counter-cyclicality of the overall level of government spending requires taking
the stochastic trend in productivity into account. For example, assuming that ϕg = 0, the growth rate of
government expenditures would still be positively correlated with total factor productivity growth.10
The homogeneous good can be used for private consumption ct, government consumption gt, and in-
vestment xt. The market clearing condition on the goods market accordingly writes
yt = ct + xt + gt.
In the context of this model featuring a stochastic trend in productivity, we must modify Definition 1.
To this end, we start by defining the detrended variables yst ≡ yte−zt and gst ≡ gte−zt .
Definition 2. The long-run government spending multiplier, denoted by ∆y/∆g, is the increase in
steady-state, detrended output y¯s after an increase in steady-state, detrended government spending
expenditures g¯s, i.e. formally
∆y
∆g
≡ dy¯
s
dg¯s
.
Using this definition, we can characterize how αg and the long-run GSM are linked together. This rela-
tion is stated in the following proposition, which generalizes Proposition 1 to a setup with investment.
Proposition 3. Under the preceding assumptions:
1. The long-run government spending multiplier ∆y/∆g is
∆y
∆g
=
1− αg
1− sx + µ[1− sx − sg(1− αg)] ,
where
µ ≡ (1 + ν)(1− φ)− 1, sx ≡ (γz − 1 + δ)θβ
γz − β(1− δ) .
2. The multiplier ∆y/∆g decreases with αg.
10In section 4, we explore the robustness of our results to alternative specifications of the feedback rule.
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Proof. See Appendix F.
Notice that when αg and φ are set to zero, the above formula collapses to those reported in Baxter and
King (1993) and Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). As in the previous section, ϕg clearly
does not show up in this formula. It remains to be seen whether omitting ϕg at the estimation stage can
compromise the inference on αg.
3.2 Data and Estimation
Before, taking the model to the data, we first induce stationarity by getting rid of the stochastic trend
component zt and we log-linearize the resulting system in the neighborhood of the deterministic steady
state.11 Then, let sˆt denote the vector collecting the loglinear model variables. The log-linear solution
is of the form
sˆt = F(ψ)sˆt−1 +G(ψ)

ζz,t
ζa,t
ζb,t
ζg,t
 , (17)
where ψ is the vector of model’s parameters. The system matrices F(ψ) and G(ψ) are complicated
functions of the model’s parameters.
We use as observable variables in estimation the logs of output, consumption, hours worked, and gov-
ernment expenditures. The measurement equation is
∆ log(yt)
log(nt)
∆ log(ct)
∆ log(gt)
 =

γz − 1
mn(ψ)
γz − 1
γz − 1
+Hsˆt. (18)
Here, mn(ψ) is a function that gives average log hours as a function of ψ and H is a selection matrix.
For a given ψ, using equations (17) and (18), the log-likelihood is evaluated via standard Kalman filter
techniques. The estimated parameters are then obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood.12
The data used for estimation come from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED II database and
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website. They consist of government consumption expenditures
11See Appendix F for further details on the procedure used to induce stationarity.
12We used different measurement equations, using the logged private consumption-output and logged government
expenditures-output ratios instead of consumption growth and government expenditures growth. Estimation results were
almost identical.
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and gross investment (GCE), private investment and private consumption, all deflated by the implicit
GDP deflator (GDPDEF). Private investment is defined as the sum of gross private domestic invest-
ment (GPDI) and personal consumption expenditures on durable goods (PCDG). Private consumption is
measured as the sum of personal consumption expenditures on non-durable goods (PCND) and services
(PCESV). Output is then defined as the sum of private investment, private consumption and government
expenditures. Hours are borrowed from Francis and Ramey (2009). These hours data refer to the total
economy and are adjusted for low-frequency movements due to changes in demographics, thus display-
ing less low-frequency behavior than unadjusted data. All the series are converted to per-capita terms
by dividing them by the civilian population, age 16 and over (CNP16OV). All the series are seasonally
adjusted except for population. Our sample runs from 1960:1 to 2007:4.13
The vector of parameters ψ is split in two subvectors ψ1 and ψ2. The first one, ψ1 = (β, δ, ν, θ, sg),
contains parameters calibrated prior to estimation. Typically, these are parameters difficult to estimate
in our framework. The subjective discount factor, β, is set to 0.9951, yielding a real annual interest rate
of 3.75%. The depreciation rate, δ, is set to 0.0153, to match the average investment-output ratio. The
parameter ν is set to 4 so that the long-run labor supply elasticity µ ≡ (1 + ν)(1 − φ) − 1 is close to
2 in the benchmark model, in accordance with previous studies (see Smets and Wouters, 2007). Finally
we set θ = 0.30, so that the labor income share in output is 70%, and sg = 0.2, so as to reproduce the
average ratio of government expenditures to output in our sample.
The remaining parameters, contained in ψ2 = (φ, αg, γz, ϕg, ρg, ρa, ρb, σz, σg, σa, σb), are estimated.14
Estimation results are reported in table 1. We consider four model restrictions, according to whether αg
and ϕg are constrained. The table reports the log-likelihoodL for each model specification, which we
use naturally as our selection criterion. The restrictions are summarized below
• Model (1): αg = 0, ϕg = 0, so that g has no direct effect on the marginal utility of private
consumption and is exogenous
• Model (2): αg = 0, ϕg 6= 0, so that g has no direct effect on the marginal utility of private
consumption and is endogenous
• Model (3): αg 6= 0, ϕg = 0, so that g has a direct effect on the marginal utility of private
consumption and is exogenous
• Model (4): αg 6= 0, ϕg 6= 0, so that g has a direct effect on the marginal utility of private
consumption and is endogenous
13In section 4, we consider the robustness of our results to alternative estimation samples.
14The parameter vector ψ2 also contains n¯, which is the average level of log hours. In our setup, estimating n¯ is equivalent
to estimating η. This parameter does not play any role in the log-linearized dynamics and is not reported.
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Overall, the model specifications yield precisely estimated parameters.15 Notice that, except for ρg and
σg, most parameters are pretty invariant to the restrictions imposed on αg or ϕg.
The log-likelihood comparison suggests the following comments. First, comparing specifications (1)
with (3) or (2) with (4), one can clearly see that the restrictions αg = 0 is strongly rejected by the data.
The P -values of the associated likelihood ratio tests are almost zero. In specifications (3) and (4), the
parameter αg is negative and significantly different from zero, consistent with the above likelihood ratio
tests. This result is not an artifact of allowing for an endogenous government policy. This suggests
that private and public consumption are complements. This result echoes findings by Karras (1994).
Bouakez and Rebei (2007) and Mazraani (2010) also reach similar conclusions with a specification of
preferences in which private consumption and government expenditures interact through a CES subutil-
ity function. We also used such a model version. As discussed above, since both representations yield
the same loglinear first-order conditions, this model version yields the exact same estimation results.
However, the CES specification raises an identification problem that our specification eschews. It turns
out that the government spending weight in utility is not separately identified in the CES case.
Second, the restriction ϕg = 0 is clearly rejected by the data. To see this, compare specifications (1)
and (2) or (3) and (4). In both cases, the associated P -values are almost zero. These results strongly
support the view that government policy comprises an endogenous component. To sum up, specification
(4) is our preferred model. This specification thus features (i) a positive effect of government spending
on the marginal utility of private consumption and (ii) a countercyclical feedback effect in government
spending.16
Notice that the estimated value for ϕg is large, suggesting a strong countercyclical component to policy.
However, this should not necessarily reflect an extremely countercyclical policy. To see this, recall that
ϕg governs the cyclicality of government expenditures in deviation from the stochastic TFP trend. To
the extent that innovations to TFP account for a significant portion of fluctuations, the overall level of
government expenditures need not be overly countercyclical, even when ϕg is large.
Even though all second order moments are given the same weight in the likelihood, comparing uncon-
ditional moments from the models to their empirical counterparts is useful to get some intuition why
model (4) is preferred. Results are reported in table 2. We consider moments documenting the volatility,
persistence, and co-movement of key variables.
15We numerically checked the estimation convergence by shocking initial conditions on parameter values in the likelihood
maximization step. Upon convergence, we also plotted slices of the likelihood function around each estimated parameter
value to check local identification.
16In Appendix G, we use data simulated from specification (3) and (4) to establish that the negative empirical link found
between αg and ϕg is not idiosyncratic to our sample.
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Table 1. Estimation Results
Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3) Specification (4)
αg = 0, ϕg = 0 αg = 0, ϕg 6= 0 αg 6= 0, ϕg = 0 αg 6= 0, ϕg 6= 0
αg − − −0.6340 −0.9452
(0.1357) (0.1410)
ϕg − 0.5723 − 0.6117
(0.0803) (0.0660)
φ 0.4004 0.4138 0.3766 0.4110
(0.0764) (0.0730) (0.0714) (0.0638)
γz 1.0043 1.0043 1.0043 1.0044
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
ρg 0.9469 0.9592 0.9535 0.9756
(0.0087) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0055)
ρa 0.9762 0.9775 0.9795 0.9834
(0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0036) (0.0031)
ρb 0.8346 0.8345 0.8366 0.8399
(0.0424) (0.0411) (0.0366) (0.0330)
σz 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
σg 0.0130 0.0120 0.0129 0.0119
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006)
σa 0.0103 0.0102 0.0123 0.0133
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0013)
σb 0.0270 0.0266 0.0273 0.0266
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014)
L 2655.3227 2679.4375 2665.9338 2701.3173
Notes: Sample period: 1960:1-2007:4. Standard errors in parentheses.
All the model versions perform equally well in terms of fitting standard errors of key aggregate variables.
More interestingly, we see that whether or not αg = 0 is imposed, the correlation between changes in
private consumption and changes in government spending is smaller when ϕg > 0. To see this, compare
the results for specifications (1) against (2) or (3) against (4). This illustrates our claim that in a standard
neoclassical growth model, allowing for a countercyclical government spending policy works toward
reducing the correlation between consumption growth and government spending shocks. Similarly,
comparing the same specifications, we see that relaxing the constraint ϕg = 0 decreases the correlation
between output growth and government expenditures growth. Conversely, whether or not ϕg = 0,
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Table 2. Moments Comparison
Data Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3) Specification (4)
αg = 0, ϕg = 0 αg = 0, ϕg 6= 0 αg 6= 0, ϕg = 0 αg 6= 0, ϕg 6= 0
σ(∆y) 0.0093 0.0093 0.0093 0.0095 0.0095
σ(∆c) 0.0050 0.0071 0.0071 0.0074 0.0065
σ(∆x) 0.0327 0.0255 0.0281 0.0255 0.0308
σ(∆g) 0.0110 0.0170 0.0145 0.0168 0.0140
σ(∆n) 0.0066 0.0069 0.0068 0.0070 0.0070
ρ(∆y) 0.3200 0.1165 0.1226 0.1116 0.1304
ρ(∆c) 0.2482 0.0217 0.0232 0.0176 0.1980
ρ(∆x) 0.2057 0.1599 0.0413 0.1425 -0.0681
ρ(∆g) 0.0948 -0.0161 0.1076 -0.0139 0.1337
ρ(∆n) 0.3886 0.3299 0.3437 0.3100 0.3511
corr(∆y,∆c) 0.5115 0.6336 0.6461 0.7282 0.6541
corr(∆y,∆x) 0.9043 0.8025 0.8567 0.7315 0.8246
corr(∆y,∆g) 0.2913 0.5616 0.3354 0.5873 0.3697
corr(∆c,∆g) 0.2368 0.1999 0.0204 0.4976 0.4001
corr(∆x,∆g) -0.0288 0.1719 0.0209 0.0213 -0.1001
Notes: Sample period: 1960:1-2007:4. σ(·), ρ(·), and corr(·, ·) stand for standard deviation, first-order autocorrelation coefficient, and
correlation, respectively. ∆ is the first difference operator, y is output, c is consumption, x is investment, g is government expenditures, n
is hours worked.
relaxing the constraint αg = 0 increases the correlation between consumption growth and government
spending growth. To see this, compare the results for specifications (1) against (3) or (2) against (4).
This once again illustrates how Edgeworth complementarity and countercyclical policy interact in our
model. Finally, we also see that, irrespective of constraints imposed on αg, the restriction ϕg = 0
deteriorates the model’s ability to capture the persistence of changes in government expenditures.
We complement the above results by performing specification tests for the innovation of each variables
used for estimation in equation (18), i.e. ∆ log(yt) output growth, log(nt) the log of hours, ∆ log(ct)
private consumption growth, and ∆ log(gt) government consumption growth. The innovations are ob-
tained as the difference between the observed variables and their predicted value at convergence of the
estimation stage. The specification tests, reported in table 3, are conducted for the four model’s specifi-
cations. The first column reports the Shapiro and Wilk (1965) test statistic. The null hypothesis being
tested is that the innovation of the variables listed on the left is normally distributed. A small value
of the test statistic indicates a rejection of the null, whereas a value close to unity favors the normality
assumptions. On the right, we report the P -value (in %) of the test statistic. Except for consumption
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growth, normality is rejected in all cases. However, rejection is essentially driven by a few outliers.
Given the parametric parsimony of the model, such a rejection is hard to interpret.
Table 3. Specification Tests
Specification Normality Serial Correlation
Shapiro-Wilk P -value Coefficient Confidence
Innovation in Statistic (in %) Interval (at 95%)
(1) ∆ log(yt) 0.9657 0.0531 0.1883 [0.0482 , 0.3284]
log(nt) 0.9737 0.3513 0.0055 [−0.1372 , 0.1482]
∆ log(ct) 0.9847 7.2771 0.3146 [0.1783 , 0.4508]
∆ log(gt) 0.9686 0.1019 0.1685 [0.0267 , 0.3103]
(2) ∆ log(yt) 0.9668 0.0673 0.1821 [0.0419 , 0.3224]
log(nt) 0.9738 0.3577 -0.0170 [−0.1597 , 0.1256]
∆ log(ct) 0.9850 7.8055 0.3125 [0.1762 , 0.4489]
∆ log(gt) 0.9672 0.0741 0.0393 [−0.1045 , 0.1831]
(3) ∆ log(yt) 0.9655 0.0510 0.1948 [0.0549 , 0.3348]
log(nt) 0.9746 0.4386 0.0354 [−0.1071 , 0.1778]
∆ log(ct) 0.9860 10.7253 0.2851 [0.1476 , 0.4225]
∆ log(gt) 0.9699 0.1405 0.1504 [0.0081 , 0.2926]
(4) ∆ log(yt) 0.9681 0.0917 0.1787 [0.0384 , 0.3191]
log(nt) 0.9744 0.4246 -0.0223 [−0.1647 , 0.1201]
∆ log(ct) 0.9865 12.3860 0.0924 [−0.0505 , 0.2352]
∆ log(gt) 0.9693 0.1211 -0.0008 [−0.1447 , 0.1431]
Notes: Sample period: 1960:1-2007:4. ∆ log(yt) denotes output growth, log(nt) hours, ∆ log(ct) private consumption growth,
and ∆ log(gt) government consumption growth. Specification (1): αg = ϕg = 0, Specification (2): αg = 0 , ϕg 6= 0,
Specification (3): αg 6= 0 , ϕg = 0, Specification (4): αg 6= 0 , ϕg 6= 0. Coefficients are obtained by projecting each
innovation on its own lag.
More interestingly, table 3 also includes serial correlation tests. We report the least-squares coefficient
obtained by projecting each innovation on its own lag. For each coefficient, we report the associated
95% confidence interval. We find that omitting the feedback rule deteriorate the results. Indeed, com-
paring specification (3) and (4) shows that consumption and government spending innovations display
less serial correlation when the policy rule coefficient is not constrained to zero.
Having explored the empirical properties of model (4), we now use this version to investigate the quan-
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titative effects of omitting the government feedback rule.
3.3 Quantitative Implications for the Multiplier
In this section, we assess the quantitative impact of omitting the countercyclical component of govern-
ment expenditures policy. We proceed in two steps. First, guided by the analytical results obtained
in the previous section, we investigate the consequences for the long-run GSM of misspecifiying the
policy rule. Second, we illustrate that these effects are also present in an assessment of shorter-term
multipliers.
3.3.1 Long-Run Government Spending Multiplier
Upon inspecting models (3) and (4), we see that imposing ϕg = 0 strongly affects the estimated value of
αg. When ϕg is freely estimated, we obtain αg = −0.95 whereas we get αg = −0.63 when we impose
ϕg = 0. Importantly, these parameter estimates are significantly different from each other, according to
a standard Wald test.
What does this imply for long-run government spending multiplier? To answer this question, we use the
formula in Proposition 3 to estimate the long-run GSM. The estimated multipliers are reported in table
4, together with their standard errors. When αg is restricted to zero, the estimated long-run multiplier is
typically less than one, as obtains in standard models (see Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992,
Baxter and King, 1993). Concretely, depending on the restrictions imposed on ϕg, we obtain values
roughly comprised between 0.53 and 0.55. Importantly, comparing specifications (1) and (2) in table 4,
one can clearly see that ϕg has almost no discernible effect on the long-run multiplier. The reason why
is simple: the parameters β, δ, and ν are restricted prior to estimation. In addition, the estimation results
show that φ is relatively insensitive to the different specifications (see table 1).
In our framework, omitting the feedback effect in the policy rule can impact on the long-run output mul-
tiplier only when the parameter αg is freely estimated. This is the novel feature of our model, because
the link between the policy feedback parameter (ϕg) and the degree of Edgeworth complementarity be-
tween public and private consumptions (αg) could obviously not be studied in frameworks imposing
αg = 0. The columns associated with specifications (3) and (4) in table 4 thus give new results. More
precisely, in model (3), the output multiplier is 0.97 while it reaches 1.31 in model (4). These values are
significantly different from each other at conventional levels. As explained above, the higher multiplier
in (4) derives from a smaller αg than in (3).17
17 Similar results obtain for the multiplier on private investment. This is not surprising since this multiplier is strictly
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Table 4. Estimated Multipliers
Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3) Specification (4)
αg = 0, ϕg = 0 αg = 0, ϕg 6= 0 αg 6= 0, ϕg = 0 αg 6= 0, ϕg 6= 0
∆y/∆g 0.5319 0.5429 0.9738 1.3128
(0.0606) (0.0603) (0.1410) (0.1803)
∆c/∆g −0.5955 −0.5872 −0.2596 −0.0020
(0.0461) (0.0458) (0.1072) (0.1370)
∆x/∆g 0.1274 0.1301 0.2333 0.3148
(0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0339) (0.0433)
Notes: Sample period: 1960:1-2007:4. Standard errors in parentheses.
To complement on these results, we consider the following exercise. We set the feedback parameters
ϕg to values on a grid between ϕg = 0 and the estimated value obtained in specification (4), i.e. ϕg =
0.6117. For each value, all the remaining parameters in ψ2 are re-estimated. The results are reported on
figure 2.
The upper left panel reports the log-likelihood as a function of ϕg. The grey area corresponds to restric-
tions on ϕg that are not rejected at the 5% level according to a likelihood ratio test. This grey area is
also reported in each of the other panels in figure 2. The upper right panel reports the estimated value of
αg as a function of ϕg. The bottom panels report the long-run multipliers on output and consumption.
The figure makes clear that even loose restrictions on ϕg (i.e. restrictions not too far from the estimated
value) are easily rejected and rapidly translate into higher αg and much lower multipliers. Importantly,
the continuous and decreasing mapping from ϕg to αg (and thus on long-run multipliers) echoes the
analytical findings obtained in the simple model explored in the first section.
To sum up, there exists a strong interaction between the estimated values of ϕg and αg that have po-
tentially dramatic implications for the quantitative assessment of the long-run government spending
multiplier. We argued previously that this bias could also corrupt shorter-term multipliers. The next
section provides a quantitative illustration of this.
proportional to ∆y/∆g and the proportionality factor does not depend on αg . The multiplier on private consumption is not
significantly different from zero.
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Figure 2: Sensitivity to constraints on policy rule parameter ϕg
Notes: Sample period: 1960:1-2007:4. The feedback parametersϕg takes values on a grid between 0 and 0.6117. For each value, all the remaining
parameters in ψ2 are re-estimated. The upper left panel reports the log-likelihood as a function of ϕg . The grey area corresponds to restrictions on
ϕg that are not rejected at the 5% level according to a likelihood ratio test. This grey area is also reported in each of the other panels. The upper
right panel reports the estimated value of αg as a function of ϕg . The bottom panels report the long-run multipliers on output and consumption.
3.3.2 Implications for Short-Run Multipliers
So far, we have insisted on the long-run GSM. The main reason for this is that this number does not di-
rectly depend on the serial correlation of government policy. Focussing on this multiplier thus illustrates
in an unambiguous way how misspecifying the policy rule can result in a downward biased multiplier.
However, all our results should in principle hold equally in an assessment of shorter-term multipliers.
To illustrate this, we follow Uhlig (2010) and specify an autoregressive process for the exogenous
component of government spending designed to approximate the time profile of a recovery plan. More
precisely, we assume that the discretionary component to policy follows the process
g?t = 1.653g
?
t−1 − 0.672g?t−2,
which is initialized by setting g?0 = 0 and g
?
1 = 0.32, assuming that date t = 1 corresponds to 2009.
As argued by Uhlig (2010), this process closely approximates the government spending path reported
in Cogan et al. (2010) (see, in particular, Uhlig, 2010, figure 1).
This process is fed into three model versions which we use to compute different versions of the short-run
multiplier. First, we use specification (3), which imposes an exogenous policy at the estimation stage.
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Figure 3: Stimulus Effect on Output,
Notes: Estimated dynamic effects of government purchases in the February 2009 stimulus legislation on output, in relative deviation from steady
state. Specification (3): αg 6= 0 and ϕg = 0; specification (4): αg 6= 0 and ϕg 6= 0; in specification (4) with ϕg = 0, we use the estimated value
of αg in (4) and impose the counterfactual ϕg = 0.
Second, we use our preferred specification (4), in which policy parameters are freely estimated. Finally,
we freeze all non-policy parameters obtained in this specification and impose an exogenous policy rule
(i.e. ϕg = 0). We do this to make sure that allowing for a countercyclical policy rule does not change
the resulting short-run multiplier too much.
The results are reported in figure 3. The thick dark line corresponds to the percent deviation of GDP
from its steady state after the discretionary shock in specification (4). The dashed, dark line is the same
impulse response obtained under an exogenous policy in specification (4). Finally, the dotted line is the
GDP response obtained under specification (3). As the figure makes clear, with or without systematic
policy, the GDP response is always much higher in specification (4) than in specification (3).
Over the selected horizon, the cumulated difference between the response obtained under specification
(4) and that obtained under specification (3) is approximately 1.4% of steady-state US GDP. Now, to
make things concrete, the extra government expenditures of the ARRA package amount to 8.8% of US,
steady-state output (see Cogan et al., 2010). Thus, an econometrician using specification (3) would
understate the cumulated output effect of the ARRA package by approximately 15.5% of the package’s
size. Interestingly, the impact response of output under specification (3) is much smaller than that
obtained under specification (4). This downward bias echoes analytical results on the impact response
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of output derived in our simple model.
Notice finally that the exact value of ϕg used in simulating specification (4) does not affect quantitatively
the multiplier. This is consistent with our previous long-run findings.18 As argued before, this parameter
plays a key role only at the estimation stage. Omitting it would lead an econometrician to downward
bias the degree of Edgeworth complementarity, resulting in a seriously flawed assessment of the ARRA
impact.
4 Robustness
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our results to (i) alternative specifications for the govern-
ment spending rule, (ii) alternative estimation subsamples, and (iii) an alternative model specification
very close to Smets and Wouters (2007).
4.1 Alternative Specifications of the Feedback Rule
In this paper, the assumed fiscal rule lacks strong theoretical underpinnings, contrary to the celebrated
Taylor rule for monetary policy. It is thus central, at the very least, to establish that our specification
can be defended on empirical grounds. To this end, we reestimate the model under a large battery of
alternative government spending rules. We then use the likelihood to compare these specifications.
The alternative rules considered in this section are specified as follows
(A) log(g˜t) = −ϕg(log(yt)− zt − log(y¯s))
(B) log(g˜t) = −ϕg(log(yt−1)− zt−1 − log(y¯s))
(C) log(g˜t) = −ϕz(∆zt − log(γz))
(D) log(g˜t) = −ϕz(∆zt − log(γz))− ϕa∆at − ϕb∆bt
(E) log(g˜t) = −ϕg(∆ log(yt)− log(γz))− ϕz(∆zt − log(γz))
(F) log(g˜t) = −ϕg(∆ log(yt)− log(γz))− ϕz(∆zt − log(γz))− ϕa∆at − ϕb∆bt
(G) log(g˜t) = −ϕg(∆ log(yt−1)− log(γz))
(H) log(g˜t) = −ϕg(λ(∆ log(yt)− log(γz)) + (1− λ)(∆ log(yt−1)− log(γz)))
where, as before, y¯s denotes the steady-state value of detrended output.
18Notice however that if we were to impose αg = αˆg and ϕg = 0 in model (4), the fit would be dramatically deteriorated.
The associated log-likelihood would now equal to 2663.3995. With such a restriction, the model would generate too much
pro-cyclical movements between public spending and both output and private consumption.
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Results are reported in table 5. For comparison purpose, we reproduce the results obtained with our
preferred specification (4), referred to here as the benchmark specification. The other specifications are:
(A) the stationary component of government spending reacts to current deviations of output from its
stochastic trend; (B) the stationary component of government spending reacts to once-lagged deviations
of output from its stochastic trend; (C) the stationary component of government spending reacts to
changes in total factor productivity, resembling the specification used by Smets and Wouters (2007);
(D) the stationary component of government spending reacts to changes in all the structural shocks; (E)
combines our benchmark specification with (C); (F) combines the benchmark specification with (D).
We also consider an alternative rule (G) to our benchmark specification where we assess the effect of
log(g˜t) responding to lagged output growth. With this specification, automatic stabilizers work with
some delay. Finally, specification (H) nests our benchmark and (G), where the parameter λ put a weight
on contemporaneous output growth.19
Table 5 reports the estimated values of αg and the policy rule parameters, together with the implied
long-run multipliers and the log-likelihood. To ease comparison, we also report the estimation results
obtained under an exogenous policy (i.e. specification (3)).
As is clear from table 5, our benchmark specification dominates the alternative specifications from
(A) to (D). Notice that these specifications are not nested with our benchmark. Since our benchmark
implies a higher log-likelihood, the alternative rules are not better descriptions of the data. Moreover,
the specification test results deteriorate (not reported), especially so in terms of serial correlation of
innovations.
The specifications that yield the lowest fit are (A) and (B). Specification (A) implies a procyclical
government spending policy. In this case, the implied αg is higher than under an exogenous policy
(−0.58 in specification (A) and −0.63 under an exogenous policy). This mechanically translates into a
smaller multiplier in (A), as expected from our previous analysis. In specification (B), the policy rule is
almost acyclical and we obtain roughly similar multipliers than under an exogenous policy.20
Specification (C) implies a countercyclical policy rule in response to technology shocks, since the esti-
mated values of ϕz is positive. Once again, as expected, the estimated αg is slightly lower than under
an exogenous policy (αg = −0.71), resulting in a higher multiplier.
19We also considered versions of the fiscal rule with hours growth ∆ log(nt) instead of output growth. We basically obtain
the same results as in our benchmark specification.
20In Appendix G, we use our benchmark model as a DGP and estimate on simulated data a mispecified model assuming
that the government spending rule takes the form (A). While government policy is indeed countercyclical in the DGP,
estimation outocmes under the mispecified model result on average in a procyclical policy rule. Interestingly, the modal
estimate of ϕg in this experiment is very close to that obtained when estimating the model with rule (A) on actual data. We
use this result to set up an encompassing test which leads us to reject specification (A) in favor of specification (4).
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Table 5. Alternative Government Spending Rules
Specification αg ϕg λ ϕz ϕa ϕb φ ∆y/∆g L
Benchmark -0.9452 0.6117 — — — — 0.4110 1.3128 2701.3173
—
(A) -0.5774 -0.4866 — — — — 0.4072 0.9652 2669.6339
(B) -0.6287 0.1029 — — — — 0.3710 0.9623 2666.1522
(C) -0.7091 — — 0.3952 — — 0.3995 1.0693 2691.5604
(D) -0.7893 — — 0.4254 0.0133 -0.0500 0.3769 1.1105 2694.4357
(E) -1.0398 0.8176 — -0.1660 — — 0.4181 1.4244 2702.0942
(F) -1.2220 2.5102 — -1.4928 -0.1132 0.2264 0.3700 1.5455 2714.2522
(G) -0.6342 0.0104 — — — — 0.3769 0.9736 2665.9424
(H) -1.0730 1.0802 0.7023 — — — 0.4137 1.4514 2712.7980
—
Exogenous Policy -0.6340 — — — — — 0.3766 0.9738 2665.9338
Notes: Sample period: 1960:1-2007:4. Benchmark is specification (4): αg 6= 0 and ϕg 6= 0. Exogenous policy is specification (3): αg 6= 0 and
ϕg = 0.
Specification (D) adds to the former case by allowing policy to respond to all the shocks. This spec-
ification implies a countercyclical policy rule, in the sense that the estimated values of ϕz and ϕa are
positive while the estimated value of ϕb is negative. As expected, the Edgeworth complementarity
parameter turns out to be lower than under an exogenous policy (αg = −0.79).
Specifications (E) and (F), which nest our benchmark, imply higher log-likelihoods, by construction. A
likelihood ratio test would not reject our benchmark when compared to specification (E). In contrast, the
log-likelihood is much higher in specification (F). However, specification tests outcomes do not improve
much when compared to our benchmark.
It is not obvious a priori to tell whether or not specifications (E) and (F) feature countercyclicality of
government spending policy. However, if our claim holds in this context, one can interpret the low value
obtained for αg as suggestive of a high degree of countercyclicality.
Estimation results show that specification (G) is clearly dominated by our benchmark representation.
The log-likelihood is close to that obtained under an exogenous policy. Specification (H) confirms this
finding. When contemporaneous and once-lagged output growth appear both in the rule, our estimation
results clearly favor a contemporaneous response of government spending (the weight λ is equal to
0.7023). Notice that in this case, the degree of Edgeworth complementarity is more pronounced and,
accordingly, the model yields a higher multiplier.
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4.2 Subsample Analysis
Perotti (2005) showed that empirical measures of government spending multipliers can prove sensitive
to the particular sample selected. Importantly, he argues that multipliers over the sample 1980:1-2007:4
are smaller than those found over the sample 1960:1-1979:4. We here investigate whether our results
still hold if we re-estimate our model over the same subsamples.
Results are reported in table 6. Our previous conclusions are broadly confirmed. First, the restriction
ϕg = 0 is rejected, suggesting that government spending policy is endogenous, irrespective of the
selected sample. Second, when this restriction is imposed, we obtain a higher αg, resulting in a smaller
multiplier. This holds over both subsamples. We also obtain a smaller long-run GSM over the second
subsample, confirming results in Perotti (2005).
Table 6. Subsample Robustness
Specification αg ϕg φ ∆y/∆g L
1960:1-1979:4
(4) -1.0167 0.6033 0.3755 1.3263 1101.3585
(3) -0.7910 – 0.3896 1.1276 1088.1722
1980:1-2007:4
(4) -0.8068 0.5597 0.4146 1.1856 1614.9772
(3) -0.6100 – 0.3777 0.9580 1599.7944
Notes: Specification (4): αg 6= 0 and ϕg 6= 0; Specification (3): αg 6= 0 and ϕg = 0.
4.3 A Smets-Wouters type model
It has become common in macroeconomics to estimate richer models with many more shocks and
frictions. As a final robustness check, we thus investigate whether our results hold within a medium-
scale DSGE model along the lines of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2007). The model combines a neoclassical growth core with several shocks and frictions. It includes
features such as habit formation, investment adjustment costs, variable capital utilization, monopolistic
competition in goods and labor markets, and nominal price and wage rigidities, which help to replicate
the data. The economy is populated by five classes of agents: producers of a final good, intermediate
goods producers, households, employment agencies and a governement. We adopt the specification
investigated by Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010), except that we allow for (i) Edgeworth
complementarity/substitutability and (ii) endogeneity of public spending. On top of these refinements,
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Table 7. Estimation Results for the Smets-Wouters Type Model
Specification ω αg ϕg ∆y/∆g Marginal Likelihood
(4) – -0.626 0.752 0.869 -1277.683
[-0.914,-0.332] [0.545,0.964] [0.598,1.139]
(3) – -0.199 – 0.524 -1298.946
[-0.454,0.040] [0.364,0.721]
(4’) 0.149 -1.133 0.728 1.168 -1275.890
[0.085,0.211] [-1.443,-0.819] [0.528,0.919] [0.883,1.486]
(3’) 0.165 -0.870 – 0.893 -1296.944
[0.095,0.231] [-1.201,-0.552] [0.675,1.160]
Notes: Specification (3): ω = 0, αg 6= 0 and ϕg = 0; Specification (4): ω = 0, αg 6= 0 and ϕg 6= 0; Specification (3’): ω 6= 0, αg 6= 0 and
ϕg = 0; Specification (4’): ω 6= 0, αg 6= 0 and ϕg 6= 0. Figures in brackets are the cutoff values for the 5th and 95th percentile of the posterior
distributions.
following Cogan et al. (2010), we consider two model versions depending on whether we allow for non-
Ricardian agents. Indeed, as shown by (Galí, López-Salido and Vallés, 2007), allowing for liquidity-
constrained agents has proven to be a useful modeling device for reproducing the aggregate effect of
government spending shocks. In the remainder, we let ω denote the fraction of non-Ricardian agents.
We follow the Bayesian approach to estimate the log-linearized model. The dynamic system is cast in a
state-space representation for the set of observable variables. The Kalman filter is then used (i) to mea-
sure the likelihood of the observed variables and (ii) to form the posterior distribution of the structural
parameters by combining the likelihood function with a joint density characterizing some prior beliefs.
Given the specification of the model, the posterior distribution cannot be recovered analytically but
may be computed numerically, using a Monte-Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) sampling approach. More
specifically, we rely on the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to obtain a random draw of size 400,000 from
the posterior distribution of the parameters. We estimate the model using seven series of US quarterly
data: consumption growth, investment growth, government expenditures growth, the logarithm of hours
worked, the inflation rate, and the nominal interest rate. As before, real variables are divided by the
civilian population, age 16 and over. Once again, all the data come from the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis’ FRED II database and from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website, except hours worked that
are borrowed from Francis and Ramey (2009). Recall that the sample runs from 1960:1 to 2007:4.
We consider four model versions, labelled (3), (4), (3’), and (4’). As before, in (3), we impose ϕg = 0
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Notes: The thick plain line is the non-parametric regression and the thick dashed lines delineate the 95% confidence interval obtained by standard
bootstrap techniques. The cross indicates the average parameter values for αg and ϕg .
while in (4) this parameter is freely estimated. In both specifications, we also impose that the mass of
non-Ricardian agents be zero, i.e. ω = 0. In specifications (3’) and (4’), we freely estimate ω, while
considering ϕg = 0 in (3’) and ϕg 6= 0 in (4’). To save space, we only report estimation results for ω,
ϕg and αg.21 Importantly, we specify for ϕg and αg uniform priors centered on zero and with a standard
deviation of 0.65 and 1.30, respectively, to reflect our agnostic view concerning these key parameters.
Table 7 reports the posterior means and the associated 90% confidence interval for the parameters dis-
cussed above. Upon inspecting model (3) and (4), we see again that imposing ϕg = 0 strongly affects the
estimated value of αg: when ϕg is freely estimated, we obtain αg = −0.63 whereas we get αg = −0.20
when we set ϕg = 0. The table makes clear that ignoring the feedback rule would lower the degree of
Edgeworth complementarity. As a consequence, this would also lead to a lower long-run GSM. It is
worth noting that the implied difference in multipliers is very close to that reported in table 4. All these
findings confirm the results obtained from our benchmark model. In addition, the marginal likelihood
strongly favors the model version with endogenous policy.
When considering specifications (3’) and (4’), we obtain a small fraction of non-Ricardian agents. No-
tice that the presence of these agents does not change our basic message: the prior mean of αg is smaller
in absolute value when ϕg is constrained to zero. Once again, the marginal likelihood points to specifi-
21Model’s details and full estimation results are relegated in Appendix H.
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cation (4’) as the preferred model version.
Finally, we plot draws from the posterior distribution of (i) ϕg and αg, and (ii) ϕg and ∆y/∆g for
specification (4). Figures 4 and 5 report the outcome of this exercice. The thick plain line is the non-
parametric regression and the thick dashed lines delineate the 90% confidence interval obtained by
standard bootstrap techniques. The scatter diagram corresponds to the estimation of model (4). The
cross indicates the average parameter values for ϕg and αg in figure 4, and the average parameter values
for ϕg and ∆y/∆g, in figure 5. The figures clearly reveal -in the neighborhood of the posterior means-
the existence of (i) a negatively slopped relation between ϕg and αg and (ii) a positively slopped relation
between ϕg and ∆y/∆g. Once again, these additional quantitative exercices corroborate findings from
the simple analytical model and those from the benchmark setup.
5 Conclusion
This paper has proposed to assess quantitatively the consequences of misspecifying the government
spending rule on the estimated government spending multiplier within a DSGE framework. We first
considered a simplified model version to show analytically that omitting the feedback rule at the esti-
mation stage yields a downward-biased estimate of the long-run government spending multiplier. To
32
establish this, we first showed that the multiplier is an increasing function of the degree of Edgeworth
complementarity. In turn, complementarity and countercyclical policy interact through cross-equation
restrictions, paving the way for a potential bias. We also showed in appendix that this result holds
for other commonly considered transmission mechanisms. We then estimated on postwar US data a
quantitative model version and obtained that omitting the endogeneity of government spending exerts a
severe, downward impact on the estimated long-run multiplier. Such a bias also characterizes shorter-
term multipliers and thus can seriously affect the quantitative assessment of fiscal packages such as the
ARRA stimulus. Our results appear to be very robust to a series of perturbations to the benchmark
specification.
In our framework, we have deliberately abstracted from relevant details in order to highlight, as trans-
parently as possible, the empirical link between policy rule parameters and the degree of Edgeworth
complementarity between private and public consumption. However, the recent literature insists on
other modeling issues that might potentially affect our results. We mention two of them. First, as
put forth by Leeper, Plante and Traum (2010), a more general specification of government spending
rule, lump-sum transfers, and distortionary taxation is needed to properly fit US data. This richer spec-
ification includes in addition to the automatic stabilizer component, a response to government debt
and co-movement between tax rates. An important quantitative issue may be to assess which type of
stabilization (automatic stabilization and/or debt stabilization) interacts with the estimated degree of
Edgeworth complementarity. Second, Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) have suggested that the degree of
complementarity/substitutability between government and private consumptions is not homogeneous
over types of public expenditures. This suggests to disaggregate government spending and inspect how
feedback rules affect the estimated degree of Edgeworth complementarity in this more general setup.
These three issues will constitute the object of future researches.
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Appendix Not Intended for Publication
A Alternative Transmission Mechanisms
In the body of the paper, we considered Edgeworth complementarity/substitutability as the transmission
mechanism of government spending. In this section, we propose other mechanisms that yield the exact
same reduced form. We still consider that aggregate output is equal to the the sum of private and public
consumptions (yt = ct + gt). It follows that a multiplier exceeding one is equivalent to a positive
multiplier on private consumption. In our simple setup, the multiplier is a decreasing function of αg and
it exceeds unity when αg < ν(1− sg)/(1 + νsg).
In all the following alternative specifications, we show that the log-linear approximation of the economy
takes the form
yˆt = αgˆt + ζzt, (A.1)
as in the simple model of section 2. In what follow, we focus exclusively on the parameter α, since the
parameter ζ can be normalized to unity by rescaling appropriately the standard error of the technology
shock. Moreover, we discuss conditions on deep parameters representing preferences or technology for
the long-run GSM to exceed unity. We also show that the value of this multiplier is unambiguously
related to a single parameter summarizing the transmission mechanism of public spending.
A.1 Non-Separable Preferences
Following Linnemann (2006) and Bilbiie (2009), we consider a more general utility function. The
utility function in equation (1) rewrites more generally as u(ct, lt), where leisure lt satisfies lt = 1− nt.
Combining the optimality conditions of the households’ problem yields ul(ct, lt) = uc(ct, lt)wt.
Firms produce a homogenous good yt using the same constant returns-to-scale technology as in 2, so
that profit maximization yields wt = ezt . It immediately comes that ul(ct, lt) = uc(ct, lt)ezt . After
log-linearizing this equation, we get
ϕnˆt = zt − ψcˆt,
where ϕ ≡ (ucln/uc) − (ulln/ul) and ψ ≡ −(uccc/uc) + (uclc/ul). Using the other equilibrium
conditions, we exactly obtain equation (A.1), where the parameter α is now defined by
α ≡ ψsg
ψ + ϕ(1− sg)
The long-run government spending multiplier is then
∆y
∆g
=
ψ
ψ + ϕ(1− sg) .
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The multiplier exceeds unity when ψ > 0 and ϕ < 0. As stated in Bilbiie (2009), this imposes that
consumption be an inferior good (see also Bilbiie, 2011). The multiplier is a decreasing function of
ϕ. Assuming all the other parameters constant (in particular ψ), the long-run multiplier is then directly
linked to the key parameter ϕ summarizing households’ preferences.
A.2 Externalities
We consider two types of externalities yielding equation (A.1) exactly. One relates to the specification
of preferences, whereas the second relates to the production technology.
A.2.1 Externality in Labor Supply
We adapt Benhabib and Farmer (2000) to our simple setup. Let us rewrite the instantaneous utility
function in equation (1) as
log(ct)− η
1 + ν
(
nt
n¯ϑt
)1+ν
,
where n¯t represents the average labor supply in the economy. The parameter ϑ measures the external
effect of other households’ labor on individual utility. For example, when ϑ > 0, individual and aggre-
gate labor supplies are complement. Using the firm’s first-order condition and the aggregate resources
constraint, we obtain η(yt/zt)ν−ϑ(1+ν) = ezt/(yt − gt). Loglinearizing this yields
α =
sg
1 + (1− sg)(ν − ϑ(1 + ν))
The long-run GSM is then
∆y
∆g
=
1
1 + (1− sg)(ν − ϑ(1 + ν))
The multiplier exceeds unity whenever ϑ > ν/(1 + ν). Notice that for these values of ϑ, the constant-
consumption, aggregate labor supply is downward slopping. The multiplier is an increasing function
of ϑ. For sg and ν set to given values, the multiplier is unambiguously linked to the labor supply
externality.
A.2.2 Externality in production
We now adapt Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Devereux, Head and Lapham (1996) to our simple
setup. Let us assume that the technology takes the form
yt = e
ztntst.
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Here st is an externality on production specified as st = n¯θnt . As before, n¯t represents the average level
of labor. The parameter θn governs the productive externality. Notice that the technology displays con-
stant returns-to-scale at the private level, but increasing returns at the social level when θn > 0. In equi-
librium, the real wage obeys wt = eztnθnt . Plugging this equation into the households’ optimality condi-
tion and using the aggregate resources constraint, we obtain finally η(yt/zt)(ν−θn)/(1+θn) = ezt/(yt−gt).
Loglinearizing this yields equation (A.1), where the parameter α is now given by
α =
sg(1 + θn)
1 + θn(1− sg)(ν − θn)
The long-run GSM is
∆y
∆g
=
1 + θn
1 + θn(1− sg)(ν − θn)
The multiplier exceeds unity whenever θn > ν. Under this restriction, the aggregate labor demand is
more upward sloping than the constant-consumption labor supply (see Bilbiie, 2011). The multiplier is
an increasing function of θn. Keeping all the other parameters constant, the multiplier is unambiguously
related to the size of the production externality.
A.3 Deep Subsistence Point
We now adapt Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006) and Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2008) to
our simple setup. The instantaneous utility rewrites as
log(xct)−
η
1 + ν
n1+νt ,
where xct represents a composite consumption good, composed of a continuum of differentiated goods
indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. The composite good xct is given by
xct =
[∫ 1
0
(
cj,t − c?j
)1−1/ρ dj]1/(1−1/ρ) , (A.2)
where c?j is the subsistence level of consumption of good j. The parameter ρ > 0 is the elasticity
of substitution across varieties. Minimizing total consumption expenditures
∫ 1
0
Pj,tcj,tdj, where Pj,t
denotes the price of good j, subject to the aggregation constraint (A.2) yields the demand for each good
j
cj,t = (Pj,t/Pt)
−ρxct + c
?
j ,
where Pt = [
∫ 1
0
P 1−ρj,t dj]
1/(1−ρ) is the price index. Notice that the price elasticity is not constant as soon
as c?j > 0. The optimality condition of households’ problem is given by ηn
ν
t = wt/x
c
t .
Symmetrically with the households’problem, the government allocates spending among individual va-
rieties of goods, gj,t, so as to maximize the quantity x
g
t of a composite good
xgt =
[∫ 1
0
(
gj,t − g?j
)1−1/ρ dj]1/(1−1/ρ) ,
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where g?j denotes the subsistence level of consumption of public good j. Given the budget constraint∫ 1
0
Pj,tgj,tdj ≤ Ptgt, the government demand for each good is given by gj,t = (Pj,t/Pt)−ρxgt + g?j .
Finally, each good j is produced by a monopolist using the technology yj,t = eztnj,t. Each firm sets its
price and satisfies demand, eztnj,t ≥ cj,t+gj,t. After substituting for the expressions for the demands cj,t
and gj,t into the previous constraint, we obtain the first order conditions mcj,t = wt/ezt and Pj,t/Pt =
mkuj,t × mcj,t, where mcj,t denotes the marginal cost of labor and mkuj,t the associated markup. This
markup is given by
mkuj,t =
1− 1
ρ
(
1− c?j+g?j
yj,t
)
−1
For simplicity, we impose c?j = c
? and g?j = g
?. In a symmetric equilibrium, Pj,t/Pt = 1 ,∀j ∈ [0, 1],
so that wt = ezt/mkut. The equilibrium of this economy is then given by
(yt/e
zt)ν =
1− 1
ρ
(
1− c?+g?
yt
)
 ezt
yt − gt − c?
Denoting c? = ωc and g? = ωg, the steady-state share of subsistence consumption c? + g? in output, we
exactly obtain equation (A.1), where the parameter α is defined by
α =
sg
(ν(1− sg)(1− ω) + 1)− (1− sg)ω(mku− 1) ,
where mku > 1 is the steady-state markup, provided ρ(1−ω)−1 ≡ (µ−1)−1 > 0. The long-run GSM
is
∆y
∆g
=
1
(ν(1− sg)(1− ω) + 1)− (1− sg)ω(mku− 1)
The multiplier exceeds unity when ω > ν/(ν + µ − 1). The multiplier is an increasing function of ω.
Keeping all the other parameters constant (for example, mku is fixed), the multiplier unambiguously
depends on the relative size of the deep subsistence point.
B Proof of Proposition 1
To prove the first part of Proposition 1, evaluate equation (4) in the deterministic steady state, which
implies
ηy¯ν =
1
y¯ − (1− αg)g¯ , (B.3)
where y¯ and g¯ are the steady-state values of y and g, respectively.
Total differentiation of the above equation then yields
νdy¯ = − y¯
y¯ − (1− αg)g¯dy¯ +
(1− αg)y¯
y¯ − (1− αg)g¯dg¯. (B.4)
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Rearranging this expression and using Definition 1, one obtains finally
dy¯
dg¯
=
1− αg
1 + ν[1− sg(1− αg)] , (B.5)
as was to be shown.
To establish the second part of Proposition 1, differentiate the long-run GSM with respect to αg
∂
∂αg
(
∆y
∆g
)
= − 1 + ν
(1 + ν[1− sg(1− αg)])2 < 0.
Thus ∆y/∆g decreases with αg, as was to be shown.
C Proof of Proposition 2
C.1 Proof of Part 1
The proof of part 1 of Proposition 2 proceeds as follows. The reduced-form equations (7) and (8) rewrite
yˆt = ρyˆt−1 +
α
1 + αϕg
ut +
1
1 + αϕg
zt, (C.6)
gˆt = ρgˆt−1 +
1
1 + αϕg
ut − ϕg
1 + αϕg
∆zt, (C.7)
where ∆zt = zt − zt−1 and
ρ ≡ αϕg
1 + αϕg
.
Provided αg < 1 and ϕg ≥ 0, we have ρ ∈ [0, 1), so that (C.6) and (C.7) display second-order station-
arity. Accordingly, they can be restated as
yˆt =
1
1 + αϕg
∞∑
i=0
ρiLi(αut + zt), (C.8)
gˆt =
1
1 + αϕg
∞∑
i=0
ρiLi(ut − ϕg∆zt), (C.9)
where L is the backshift operator. Equation (C.9) can be reformulated as
gˆt =
1
1 + αϕg
[( ∞∑
i=0
ρiLi
)
ut − ϕg
(
1 +
ρ− 1
ρ
∞∑
i=1
ρiLi
)
zt
]
(C.10)
Combining (C.8) and (C.10), one obtains
E[yˆgˆ] =
1
(1 + αϕg)2
(
ασ2u
1− ρ2 −
ϕgσ
2
z
1 + ρ
)
. (C.11)
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Then using the definition of ρ, (C.11) rewrites
E[yˆgˆ] =
(1 + αϕg)ασ
2
u − ϕgσ2z
(1 + αϕg)(1 + 2αϕg)
. (C.12)
From (C.10), one also obtains
E[gˆ2] =
1
(1 + αϕg)2
(
σ2u
1− ρ2 +
2ϕ2gσ
2
z
1 + ρ
)
. (C.13)
Then using the definition of ρ, (C.13) rewrites
E[gˆ2] =
(1 + αϕg)σ
2
u + 2ϕ
2
gσ
2
z
(1 + αϕg)(1 + 2αϕg)
. (C.14)
Now, combining (C.12), (C.14), and the definition of ˆ˜α yields
ˆ˜α ≡ E[yˆgˆ]
E[gˆ2]
=
(1 + αϕg)ασ
2
u − ϕgσ2z
(1 + αϕg)σ2u + 2ϕ
2
gσ
2
z
,
as was to be shown.
C.2 Proof of Part 2
The proof of part 2 of Proposition 2 is straightforward. Form the difference ˆ˜α− α, which yields
ˆ˜α− α = − ϕgσ
2
z(1 + 2αϕg)
(1 + αϕg)σ2u + 2ϕ
2
gσ
2
z
. (C.15)
This expression is strictly negative whenever ϕg > 0 and σz > 0, as was to be shown.
C.3 Proof of Part 3
To prove the third part of proposition 2, differentiate (C.15) with respect to ϕg. Assuming σz > 0, this
yields
∂
∂ϕg
( ˆ˜α− α) = −
(
1
ω(1 + αϕg) + 2ϕ2g
)2
P (ϕg), (C.16)
where we defined ω ≡ (σu/σz)2 and
P (ϕg) ≡ 2(α2ω − 1)ϕ2g + 4αωϕg + ω. (C.17)
The expression in equation (C.16) is defined for ϕg = 0 whenever ω > 0, i.e. whenever σu > 0. To
simplify the analysis, we henceforth impose this condition. The sign of ∂( ˆ˜α − α)/∂ϕg depends on the
sign of P (ϕg). In turn, the sign of P (ϕg) depends on the sign of α2ω − 1, which calls for the following
discussion:
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• If α = σz/σu, then α2ω − 1 = 0, and thus P (ϕg) = 4αωϕg + ω > 0 for ϕg ≥ 0. Hence
∀ϕg ≥ 0, ∂
∂ϕg
( ˆ˜α− α) < 0.
• Now, if α > σz/σu, then α2ω − 1 > 0, and thus P (ϕg) admits two negative roots (as can be read
from the coefficients). Thus, for ϕg ≥ 0, P (ϕg) > 0. Hence
∀ϕg ≥ 0, ∂
∂ϕg
( ˆ˜α− α) < 0.
• Finally, if α < σz/σu, then α2ω − 1 < 0, and thus P (ϕg) admits roots of opposite signs (as can
be read from the coefficients). Let ϕ¯g(α, σz, σu) define the positive root, i.e.
ϕ¯g(α, σz, σu) ≡ 2αω +
√
2ω(α2ω + 1)
2(1− α2ω) > 0.
Since the parabola opens downward, P (ϕg) ≥ 0 for ϕg ∈ [0, ϕ¯g(α, σz, σu)] and P (ϕg) < 0 for
ϕg > ϕ¯g(α, σz, σu). Thus
∂
∂ϕg
( ˆ˜α− α) ≤ 0, ∀ϕg ∈ [0, ϕ¯g(α, σu, σz)],
∂
∂ϕg
( ˆ˜α− α) > 0, ∀ϕg > ϕ¯g(α, σu, σz).
This completes the proof.
D Additional Real Frictions
A central ingredient of our preferred specification is the presence of dynamic complementarities in labor
supply. Importantly, output dynamics inherit the built-in persistence of hours worked generated by this
mechanism.
The recent DSGE literature, however, has emphasized alternative real frictions capable of generating
very strong aggregate persistence. Important such mechanisms are habits in consumption and dynamic
investment adjustment costs, see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). We considered versions of
our preferred model augmented with these additional mechanisms.
When either of these are included, they do not significantly contribute to the model’s fit. A standard
likelihood ratio test would not reject the restriction of no habits in consumption and/or no dynamic ad-
justment costs. For example, in the case of specification (4) augmented with habits in consumption and
dynamic adjustment costs, the log-likelihood is equal to 2702.22, to be compared to our reference spec-
ification (4) where the log-likelihood is equal to 2701.32. The habits in consumption parameter is equal
to 0.11 (not significantly different from zero at conventional levels) and the adjustment cost parameter
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is almost zero. In addition, we redo the specification tests (normality and serial correlation). Including
habits in consumption and dynamic adjustment costs does not improve upon the model performance:
the normality test statistic is almost the same for each innovation and the serial correlation coefficients
are very similar.
More importantly for our purpose, the empirical interaction between αg and ϕg still holds under this
more complete framework. In particular, when ϕg is constrained to zero, we obtain αg = −0.21,
yielding a multiplier ∆y/∆g = 0.85. In contrast, when ϕg is freely estimated, government policy turns
out to be countercyclical (ϕg = 0.60) and the parameter αg = −0.79, implying a multiplier equal to
1.19. This confirms our main result.
E News Shocks in the Government Spending Rule
As emphasized by Ramey (2009) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2008), the expected component in
public expenditures constitutes an important element of government policy. We accordingly modify our
benchmark specification to allow for news shocks in the government spending rule, according to
g?t = ρgg
?
t−1 +
q∑
i=0
σg,iζg,t−i, ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , q}, σg,i ≥ 0,
where the ζg,t is iid with ζg,t ∼ N(0, 1).
We first imposed q = 4. According to our estimation results, we obtain that lags i = 1, 2, 3 are not
significant. This specification delivers a significantly better fit to the data than our preferred model (4),
according to the likelihood ratio test (in this case, the log-likelihood is equal to 2717.39). However, the
parameter estimates do not change too much compared to specification (4). In particular, the parameter
αg is now equal to −0.86, whereas the feedback rule parameter is equal to 0.59. In addition, allowing
for news shocks in government spending does not improve upon the specification tests of our reference
model (4).
Importantly, adding news shocks does not modify our main conclusion. When policy is exogenous
(ϕg = 0), we obtain αg = −0.21, with an associated multiplier equal to 0.56. In contrast, when ϕg is
freely estimated, we obtain αg = −0.86, resulting in a higher multiplier ∆y/∆g = 1.11.
F Proof of Proposition 3
To prove the first part of Proposition 3, we start by characterizing the deterministic steady state. The
latter is defined in terms of detrended variables. To be more specific, we induce stationarity according
to the following formulas
cst ≡ cte−zt , xst ≡ xte−zt , gst ≡ gte−zt , yst ≡ yte−zt , kst+1 ≡ kt+1e−zt .
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Using these definitions and the equilibrium conditions, the model steady state is solution to the system
of equations
c¯s + x¯s + g¯s = y¯s, (F.18)
y¯s =
(
k¯s
γz
)θ
n¯1−θ, (F.19)
1
c¯s + αgg¯s
(1− θ)y¯s = η(1− βφ)n¯(1+ν)(1−φ), (F.20)
1 =
β
γz
(
1− δ + θγzy¯
s
k¯s
)
, (F.21)
x¯s =
(
1− 1− δ
γz
)
k¯s. (F.22)
From (F.21) and (F.22), one can solve for the capital-output and investment-output ratios
y¯s
k¯s
=
γz − β(1− δ)
βθγz
,
sx ≡ x¯
s
y¯s
=
βθ(γz − 1 + δ)
γz − β(1− δ) .
It follows from these relations that sx and y¯s/k¯s do not depend on g¯s. Thus, the ratio y¯s/n¯ does not
either depend on g¯s.
Now, differentiating equation (F.18) with respect to g¯s yields
dc¯s
dg¯s
= (1− sx)dy¯
s
dg¯s
− 1. (F.23)
Differentiating equation (F.20), one obtains
(sc + αgsg)
dy¯s
dg¯s
= (1 + ν)(1− φ)(sc + αgsg) y¯
s
n¯
dn¯
dg¯s
+
∂c¯s
∂g¯s
+ αg,
where
sc ≡ c¯
s
y¯s
.
Now, since the ratio y¯s/n¯ does not depend on g¯s, it must be the case that
1
n¯
dn¯
dg¯s
=
1
y¯s
dy¯s
dg¯s
,
so that the previous equation rewrites
(sc + αgsg)[1− (1 + ν)(1− φ)]dy¯
s
dg¯s
=
dc¯s
dg¯s
+ αg.
Using equation (F.23) and Definition 1, one arrives at
∆y
∆g
=
1− αg
1− sx + µ[1− sx − sg(1− αg)] ,
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where we made use of the identity sc = 1− sx − sg.
To prove the second part of Proposition 3, differentiate the long-run GSM with respect to αg, which
implies
∂
∂αg
(
∆y
∆g
)
= − (1− sx)(1 + µ)
(1− sx + µ[1− sx − sg(1− αg)])2 < 0.
This completes the proof.
G Results from Simulated Data
In this section, we expound additional results based on simulated data.
G.1 Simulation results on the estimation bias for the degree of Edgeworth com-
plementarity
Based on our previous results, one can suspect that the greater αg obtained under model (3) is the
outcome of a misspecification bias. Indeed, we previously saw that omitting ϕg always increases the
estimated value of αg. In the simple model considered in the first section, we were able to formally show
the existence of such a bias. In our DSGE framework, no such analytical results is available, though the
same economic forces seem to be at play when we estimate our model on actual data.
In this appendix, we resort to simulation techniques in order to investigate whether the negative link
between αg and ϕg is idiosyncratic to our sample. In addition, resorting to simulation enables us to
investigate whether ϕg can be estimated to non-zero values even in a world where no such mechanism
exists (an exercise that we can hardly perform on actual data).
To investigate these points, we develop a controlled experiment in which we use our model as our
DGP, using the estimated values reported in table 1. More specifically, using model (4) as our DGP
we first want to make sure that (i) estimating specification (4) on simulated data delivers consistent pa-
rameter estimates and (ii) estimating specification (3) on the exact same simulated data yields severely
biased estimates of αg. To complement on this, we also run the symmetric estimations in which we
use model (3) as our DGP and successively estimate specifications (3) and (4) on simulated data. In
this case, the crucial point is to check whether our estimation procedure is able to properly reject
a policy feedback rule when no such rule exists in simulated data. Our Monte Carlo simulations
are run as follows: using either model (4) or model (3), we generate 1000 samples of observables
(∆ log(yt), log(nt),∆ log(ct),∆ log(gt), with the same sample size as actual data, after having elimi-
nated 800 initial observations, thus ensuring that initial conditions do not contaminate our estimation
results. To do so, the four structural shocks innovations are drawn from independent Gaussian distribu-
tions with zero mean and unit variance. On each simulated sample, we estimate specifications (3) and
(4) and thus generate a population of estimated parameters.
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Table 8. Simulation Results
DGP: Specification (4) DGP: Specification (3)
αg 6= 0, ϕg = 0 αg 6= 0, ϕg 6= 0
Estimated Models Estimated Models
Parameters True Value (4) (3) True Value (4) (3)
αg -0.9452 -0.9095 -0.5945 -0.6340 -0.6100 -0.6134
ϕg 0.6117 0.6140 — — -0.0075 —
φ 0.4110 0.4052 0.3848 0.3766 0.3845 0.3845
γz 1.0044 1.0045 1.0043 1.0043 1.0044 1.0044
ρg 0.9756 0.9729 0.9181 0.9535 0.9455 0.9459
ρa 0.9834 0.9736 0.9572 0.9795 0.9698 0.9699
ρb 0.8399 0.8302 0.8093 0.8366 0.8213 0.8215
σz 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107
σg 0.0119 0.0118 0.0137 0.0129 0.0128 0.0129
σa 0.0133 0.0123 0.0096 0.0123 0.0113 0.0113
σb 0.0266 0.0265 0.0277 0.0273 0.0272 0.0272
Notes: Simulation results obtained from 1000 replications. Model (4): αg 6= 0 and ϕg 6= 0; Model (3): αg 6= 0 and ϕg = 0. In
each case, we report the average value of parameters across simulations.
Table 8 reports the simulation results when using either specifications (4) or (3) as DGP and/or estimated
model. We first check whether estimating model (4) on data simulated from model (4) yields consistent
parameter estimates. It turns out that this is the case. Indeed, we see from table 8 that the average
parameters estimates almost coincide with the true ones. Now, consider what happens when estimating
model (3) on data simulated from model (4). In this case, all the parameters linked to government
policy (αg, ρg, σg) turn out to be biased. This is particularly striking when it comes to αg, the average
value of which is almost twice as small (in absolute term) as the true one. Interestingly, the average
estimated value of αg from our simulation experiment is very similar to what obtains from actual data
when estimating model (3).
Consider now what happens when using specification (3) as our DGP. The results are reported in table 8.
We first check whether estimating specification (3) on data simulated from model (3) yields consistent
estimates. This again turns out to be the case. Now, consider what happens when estimating model
(4) on data simulated from model (3). Basically, this procedure is able to recover the true parameters
on average. This is particularly striking when it comes to the feedback parameter ϕg, which is zero on
average. Recall that the latter does not exist in model (3), the DGP used for this simulation experiment,
and appears only in model (4). This implies that a significant ϕg on actual data does not seem to be an
artifact of our particular sample.
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G.2 Simulation results on countercyclical policy
In our robustness analysis, we considered several alternative government spending rules and used simple
likelihood comparisons to motivate why we selected our benchmark specification. In particular, we used
this approach to discriminate between our benchmark specification and an alternative rule in which the
endogenous component of detrended government expenditures react to detrended output (in relative
deviation from its steady-state value). This alternative rule is widespread in the literature and has a
very important implication: using it, we would most definitely conclude that governement spending is
procyclical, in stark contrast with what obtains under our preferred specification. In the remainder, our
benchmark is labelled (4) and the alternative specification is labelled (A), as in our analysis of alternative
fiscal rules.
In this section, we consider an alternative empirical validation exercise which consists in resorting
to an encompassing criterion.22 Under this criterion, a specification must not just be judged based
on the associated likelihood. It must also be able to predict the results based on an opposing model
(specification (A) in our case). If one of the two views fails this encompassing test, the one that passes
should be preferred.
Table 9. Simulation Results – Encompassing test
DGP: Specification (4) DGP: Specification (4’)
Estimated Models Estimated Models
Parameters True Value (4) (A) True Value (4) (A)
αg -0.9452 -0.9095 -0.5498 -0.5773 -0.8950 -0.5676
ϕg 0.6117 0.6140 -0.3791 -0.4866 0.0681 -0.4854
φ 0.4110 0.4052 0.4051 0.4072 0.3702 0.4149
γz 1.0044 1.0045 1.0043 1.0043 1.0043 1.0043
ρg 0.9756 0.9729 0.9116 0.9547 0.9730 0.9478
ρa 0.9834 0.9736 0.9564 0.9776 0.9703 0.9686
ρb 0.8399 0.8302 0.8024 0.8396 0.8425 0.8158
σz 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107
σg 0.0119 0.0118 0.0134 0.0123 0.0128 0.0122
σa 0.0133 0.0123 0.0094 0.0119 0.0131 0.0112
σb 0.0266 0.0265 0.0275 0.0273 0.0268 0.0271
Notes: Simulation results obtained from 1000 replications. Fiscal rule under model (4): log(g˜t) = −ϕg(∆ log(yt) − log(γz));
Fiscal rule under model (A): log(g˜t) = −ϕg(log(yst )− log(y¯s)), where, yst = yte−zt and y¯s is the steady-state value of yst . In
each case, we report the average value of parameters across simulations.
We proceed as before. Using either (4) or (A) as our DGP, we estimate specifications (4) and (A) on
simulated data. Our Monte Carlo simulations are conducted in the exact same way as before.
22See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson (2003) for an early example of this approach.
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These simulation results are reported in table 9. For each DGP, the table reports the “true value”, i.e. the
parameter values obtained when estimating the model on actual data and used to simulate the model.
Consider first what happens when specification (4) is our DGP. As before, we see that when estimating
(4) on data simulated from (4), our procedure recovers parameter values close to their true values (albeit
with a small sample bias). More interestingly, when we estimate specification (A) on data simulated
from (4), we obtain parameter values close to what obtains when estimating (A) on actual data. Thus,
specification (4) encompasses specification (A). Now, let us proceed the other way around and use (A) as
our DGP. Clearly, if (A) were to be estimated on data simulated from (A), we would on average recover
the true parameter values (once again, with a small sample bias). However, if (4) were to be estimated
on data simulated from (A), we would not recover the parameter values obtained when estimating (4)
on actual data. Thus, (A) fails to encompass (4).
To sum up, specification (4) encompasses specification (A) while the converse is not true. This is yet
another confirmation that our benchmark specification is a good description of the data. It also serves
the purpose of reinforcing our empirical results on the countercyclicality of the government spending
rule.
H The Smets-Wouters model
This section describes our medium-scale DSGE model, which is similar to Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). The model combines a neoclassical growth core with
several shocks and frictions. It includes features such as habit formation, investment adjustment costs,
variable capital utilization, monopolistic competition in goods and labour markets, and nominal price
and wage rigidities.
The economy is populated by five classes of agents: producers of a final good, intermediate goods
producers, households, employment agencies, and the government.
H.1 Household sector
H.1.1 Employment agencies
As in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), each household, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], is a monopolistic
supplier of specialized labor nt(j). At every point in time t, a large number of competitive “employment
agencies” combine households’ labor into a homogenous labor input nt sold to intermediate firms,
according to
nt =
(∫ 1
0
nt(j)
1
λw,t dj
)λw,t
, (H.24)
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where λw,t = λweεw,t , λw is the desired steady-state wage markup over the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure, and the markup shock εw,t is assumed to evolve according to
εw,t = ρwεw,t−1 + σwζw,t, ζw,t ∼ Niid(0, 1).
Profit maximization by the perfectly competitive employment agencies implies the labor demand func-
tion
nt(j) =
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)− λw,t
λw,t−1
nt, (H.25)
where Wt(j) is the wage paid by the employment agencies to the household supplying labor variety j,
while
Wt ≡
(∫ 1
0
Wt(j)
1
λw,t−1 dj
)λw,t−1
(H.26)
is the wage paid to homogenous labor.
H.1.2 Household’s preferences
Household j has preferences given by
Et
∞∑
s=0
βseεc,t+s
[
log(c˜t+s − hc˜t+s−1)− η
1 + ν
nt+s(j)
1+ν
]
, (H.27)
where Et denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional upon information available at t,
c˜t ≡ ct + αggt, ct denotes consumption, gt is government expenditures, nt(j) is labor of type j, β is the
subjective discount factor, h ∈ [0, 1] denotes the degree of habit formation, ν > 0 is the elasticity of
labor supply with respect to the real wage, η is a scale parameter, and εc,t is a preference shock evolving
according to
εc,t = ρcεc,t−1 + σcζc,t, ζc,t ∼ Niid(0, 1).
As we explain below, households are subject to idosyncratic shocks about whether they are able to re–
optimize their wage. Hence, the above described problem makes the choices of wealth accumulation
contingent upon a particular history of wage rate decisions, thus leading to households heterogeneity.
For the sake of tractability, we assume that the momentary utility function is separable across consump-
tion and leisure. Combining this with the assumption of a complete set of contingent claims market, all
the households will make the same choices regarding consumption and will only differ by their wage
rate and supply of labor. This is directly reflected in our notations.
Household j’s period budget constraint is given by
Pt(ct + xt) + Tt +Bt ≤ Bt+1/Rt +Qt(j) +Dt +Wt(j)nt(j) + Ptrkt utk¯t−1 − Ptϑ(ut)k¯t−1, (H.28)
where xt is investment, Tt denotes nominal lump–sum taxes (transfers if negative), Bt is the quantity
one-period riskless nominal bond acquired at t and maturing at t+ 1, Rt is the nominal interest rate on
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bonds, Qt(j) is the net cash flow from household j’s portfolio of state contingent securities, Dt is the
equity payout received from the ownership of firms, and rkt is the real rental rate of capital. The capital
utilization rate ut transforms physical capital k¯t into the service flow of effective capital kt according to
kt = utk¯t−1, (H.29)
and the effective capital is rented to intermediate firms at the real rental rate rkt . The costs of capital
utilization per unit of capital is given by the convex function ϑ(ut). We assume that u = 1, ϑ(1) = 0,
and we define
ηu ≡ ϑ
′′(1)/ϑ′(1)
1 + ϑ′′(1)/ϑ′(1)
.
Later, we estimate ηu rather than the elasticity ϑ′′(1)/ϑ′(1) to avoid convergence issues.
The physical capital accumulates according to
k¯t = (1− δ) k¯t−1 + eεx,t
(
1− S
(
xt
xt−1
))
xt (H.30)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital, S(·) is an adjustment cost function which satisfies S(γz) =
S ′(γz) = 0 and S ′′(γz) = ηk > 0, γz is the steady-state growth rate of technology, and εx,t is an
investment shock, evolving according to
εx,t = ρxεx,t−1 + σxζx,t, ζx,t ∼ Niid(0, 1).
Households set nominal wages in a staggered fashion, following Calvo (1983). In each period, a fraction
αw of households cannot choose their wage optimally, but adjust it to keep up with the increase in the
general wage level in the previous period according to the indexation rule
Wt(j) = pi
1−γwpiγwt−1Wt−1(j), (H.31)
where pit ≡ Pt/Pt−1 represents the gross inflation rate, pi is steady–state (or trend) inflation and the
coefficient γw ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of indexation to past wages. The remaining fraction of households
chooses instead an optimal wage, to maximize (H.27), subject to the labor demand function (H.25).
H.2 Business sector
H.2.1 Final good producers
At every point in time t, perfectly competitive firms produce a final good yt by combining a continuum
of intermediate goods yt(i), i ∈ [0, 1], according to the technology
yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt(i)
1
λp,t di
)λp,t
, (H.32)
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where λp,t = λpeεp,t , λp is the desired steady–state price markup over the marginal cost of intermediate
firms, and the markup shock εp,t is assumed to evolve according to
εp,t = ρpεp,t−1 + σpζp,t, ζp,t ∼ Niid(0, 1).
Final good producing firms take their output price, Pt, and their input prices, Pt(i), as given and beyond
their control. Profit maximization implies the following first-order condition
yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)− λp,t
λp,t−1
yt. (H.33)
Integrating (H.33) and imposing (H.32), we obtain the following relationship between the final good
and the prices of the intermediate goods
Pt ≡
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1
λp,t−1 di
)λp,t−1
. (H.34)
H.2.2 Intermediate-goods firms
Intermediate good i ∈ [0, 1] is produced by a monopolist firm using the following production function
yt(i) = kt(i)
θ (eztht(i))
1−θ − eztF, (H.35)
where θ denotes the capital share, kt(i) and ht(i) denote the amounts of capital and effective labor used
by firm i, F is a fixed cost of production that ensures that profits are zero in steady state, and zt is an
exogenous labor–augmenting productivity, evolving according to
zt = log(γz) + zt−1 + εz,t
where εz,t is a permanent productivity shock
εz,t = ρzεz,t−1 + σzζz,t, ζz,t ∼ Niid(0, 1).
In addition, we assume that intermediate firms rent capital and labor in perfectly competitive factor
markets.
Intermediate firms set prices in a staggered fashion, following Calvo (1983). In each period, a fraction
αp of firms cannot choose their price optimally, but adjust it to keep up with the increase in the general
price level in the previous period according to the indexation rule
Pt(i) = pi
1−γppiγpt−1Pt−1(i), (H.36)
where the coefficient γp ∈ [0, 1] indicates the degree of indexation to past prices. The remaining fraction
of firms chooses its price P ?t (i) optimally, by maximizing the present discounted value of future profits
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βαp)
sΛt+s
Λt
{
Πpt,t+sP
?
t (i)yt+s(i)− [Wt+sht+s(i)− rkt+skt+s(i)]
}
(H.37)
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where Λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on household j’s nominal budget constraint and
Πpt,t+s ≡
{ ∏s
ν=1 pi
1−γppiγpt+v−1 s > 0
1 s = 0,
(H.38)
subject to the demand from final goods firms given by equation (H.33) and the production function
(H.35).
H.3 Public sector
The government faces the budget constraint
Ptgt +Bt = Tt +
Bt+1
Rt
.
The government spending rule is, as before, given by
gte
−zt = g¯sg˜teεg,t ,
where g¯s denotes the deterministic steady–state value of gte−zt . The endogenous policy component g˜t
obeys
log(g˜t) = −ϕg (∆ log(yt)− log(γz)) , (H.39)
and the exogenous component evolves according to
εg,t = ρgεg,t−1 + σgζg,t, ζg,t ∼ Niid(0, 1).
The short–run nominal interest rate Rt is set according to
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)φR [(pit
pi
)φpi ( yt
yp,t
)φy](1−φR)(ytyp,t−1
yp,tyt−1
)φ∆y
eσRζR,t (H.40)
where R is the steady state of the gross nominal interest rate and ζR,t is Niid (0, 1). The monetary au-
thorities follow a generalized Taylor rule by gradually adjusting the nominal rate in response to inflation
and the output gap, defined as the ratio of actual to potential output (i.e. the level of output that would
prevail under flexible prices and wages and constant elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods
and labor types). In addition, there is a short-run feedback from the change in the output gap.
H.4 Market clearing
Market clearing condition on final goods market is given by
yt = ct + xt + gt + ϑ (ut) k¯t−1. (H.41)
∆p,tyt =
(
utk¯t−1
)θ
(eztnt)
1−θ − eztF (H.42)
where ∆p,t =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)− λpεp,t
λpεp,t−1 di is a measure of the price dispersion.
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H.5 Non-Ricardian Agents
As in Cogan et al. (2010), we also consider a version of the SW model featuring a fraction ω of non-
Ricardian agents. These agents do not have access to financial markets and simply consume their
disposable income in each and every period. Disposable income, in turn, equals wage receipts net of
lump-sum taxes.
H.6 Detailed Estimation Results
Four parameters are calibrated before estimation. These are: the discount factor β = 0.99, the deprecia-
tion rate δ = 0.025, the steady-state wage markup λw = 0.15, and the steady-state share of government
spending in output sg = 0.20.
In table 10, we report our estimation results in the SW model. As before, we consider analogs to
specifications (3) and (4). In (3), we impose ϕg = 0 while in (4) this parameter is freely estimated.
In both specifications, we also impose that the mass of non-Ricardian agents be zero, i.e. ω = 0. In
specifications (3’) and (4’), we freely estimate ω, while considering ϕg = 0 in (3’) and ϕg 6= 0 in (4’).
Table 10. Estimated parameters in the SW model
Prior Posterior
SW Specification SW with NR agents
Model 3 Model 4 Model 3’ Model 4’
ω B [0.50,0.2] – – 0.165
[0.095,0.231]
0.149
[0.085,0.211]
ϕg U [0,0.65] – 0.752
[0.545,0.964]
– 0.628
[0.528,0.919]
αg U [0,1.30] −0.199
[−0.454,0.040]
−0.626
[−0.914,−0.332]
−0.870
[−1.201,−0.552]
−1.133
[−1.443,−0.819]
ν N [2,0.75] 2.829
[1.882,3.782]
2.952
[1.991,3.895]
3.054
[2.062,4.030]
3.356
[2.184,4.094]
h B [0.6,0.1] 0.642
[0.579,0.709]
0.634
[0.557,0.709]
0.571
[0.484,0.666]
0.585
[0.480,0.693]
ηu B [0.5,0.1] 0.544
[0.395,0.699]
0.665
[0.487,0.852]
0.587
[0.440,0.736]
0.608
[0.444,0.770]
ηk N [4,1] 6.066
[4.698,7.438]
5.450
[3.886,6.979]
5.747
[4.392,7.081]
5.624
[4.260,6.973]
θ N [0.33,0.05] 0.174
[0.144,0.204]
0.204
[0.173,0.234]
0.179
[0.154,0.205]
0.200
[0.172,0.229]
log(γz) N [0.5,0.1] 0.485
[0.399,0.574]
0.458
[0.360,0.548]
0.476
[0.392,0.559]
0.461
[0.373,0.548]
αp B [0.66,0.1] 0.910
[0.884,0.941]
0.876
[0.834,0.925]
0.906
[0.865,0.947]
0.884
[0.844,0927]
αw B [0.66,0.1] 0.906
[0.867,0.945]
0.889
[0.852,0.929]
0.921
[0.884,0.959]
0.907
[0.872,0.944]
γp B [0.5,0.15] 0.083
[0.028,0.135]
0.089
[0.032,0.144]
0.074
[0.026,0.121]
0.083
[0.029,0.135]
γw B [0.5,0.15] 0.703
[0.566,0.842]
0.725
[0.592,0.864]
0.712
[0.583,0.851]
0.724
[0.595,0.854]
λp N [0.15,0.1] 0.117
[0.031,0.204]
0.226
[0.136,0.322]
0.107
[0.021,0.192]
0.196
[0.109,0.283]
Continued on next page
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Prior Posterior
SW Specification SW with NR agents
Model 3 Model 4 Model 3’ Model 4’
φR B [0.6,0.2] 0.805
[0.769,0.841]
0.800
[0.767,0.835]
0.820
[0.784,0.856]
0.819
[0.788,0.852]
φpi N [1.7,0.3] 1.589
[1.364,1.805]
1.528
[1.338,1.720]
1.657
[1.421,1.902]
1.597
[1.380,1.788]
φy N [0.125,0.05] 0.067
[0.026,0.113]
0.018
[−0.011,0.056]
0.063
[0.003,0.108]
0.018
[−0.012,0.051]
φ∆y N [0.125,0.05] 0.287
[0.239,0.338]
0.252
[0.199,0.302]
0.281
[0.232,0.331]
0.252
[0.201,0.301]
ρw B [0.6,0.2] 0.253
[0.144,0.366]
0.244
[0.133,0.352]
0.277
[0.159,0.387]
0.272
[0.159,0.384]
ρb B [0.6,0.2] 0.759
[0.689,0.832]
0.788
[0.710,0.872]
0.824
[0.746,0.899]
0.842
[0.757,0.931]
ρx B [0.6,0.2] 0.758
[0.662,0.839]
0.888
[0.754,0.997]
0.780
[0.683,0.873]
0.873
[0.764,0.977]
ρp B [0.6,0.2] 0.858
[0.781,0.934]
0.871
[0.783,0.964]
0.898
[0.830,0.987]
0.873
[0.788,0.958]
ρz B [0.3,0.2] 0.251
[0.129,0.377]
0.180
[0.062,0.298]
0.184
[0.059,0.297]
0.132
[0.023,0.228]
ρg B [0.6,0.2] 0.987
[0.977,0.998]
0.978
[0.958,0.998]
0.989
[0.980,0.999]
0.984
[0.970,0.999]
σw IG [0.1,2] 0.231
[0.195,0.267]
0.239
[0.202,0.275]
0.223
[0.186,0.260]
0.230
[0.193,0.266]
σb IG [0.1,2] 0.041
[0.029,0.052]
0.041
[0.026,0.057]
0.046
[0.032,0.060]
0.046
[0.027,0.064]
σx IG [0.1,2] 0.429
[0.353,0.507]
0.424
[0.310,0.537]
0.437
[0.359,0.512]
0.407
[0.325,0.482]
σp IG [0.1,2] 0.049
[0.033,0.065]
0.055
[0.036,0.073]
0.042
[0.027,0.056]
0.053
[0.034,0.070]
σz IG [0.1,2] 0.860
[0.772,0.951]
0.933
[0.824,1.041]
0.848
[0.762,0.935]
0.905
[0.804,1.004]
σg IG [0.1,2] 1.116
[1.012,1.214]
1.207
[1.078,1.330]
1.114
[1.013,1.213]
1.187
[1.069,1.307]
σR IG [0.1,2] 0.229
[0.208,0.249]
0.222
[0.202,0.243]
0.227
[0.207,0.247]
0.222
[0.202,0.241]
L −1298.946 −1277.683 −1296.944 −1275.890
Notes: Sample period: 1960:1-2007:4. Notice that all the data have been multiplied by 100. In the column labelled Prior, B, N ,
U ,IG denote Beta, Normal, Uniform, and Inverse Gamma prior densities, respectively. The figures in brackets are the prior mean
and the prior standard deviation. In the columns labelled Posterior, the figures correspond to the posterior mean and the figures in
brackets below the posterior mean indicate the posterior 90% interval. The model specification are as follows. In (3), we impose
ω = 0, ϕg = 0, and αg 6= 0; in (4), we impose ω = 0, ϕg 6= 0, and αg 6= 0; in (3’) we impose ω 6= 0, ϕg = 0, and αg 6= 0; in
(4’), we impose ω 6= 0, ϕg 6= 0, and αg 6= 0. Finally,L denotes the marginal log-likelihood.
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